Peer review networks between Bitcoin traders by Lepomäki, Laura
1Laura Lepomäki 
PEER REVIEW NETWORKS BETWEEN 
BITCOIN TRADERS 
Faculty of Engineering and Natural Sciences 
Master of Science Thesis 
October 2019 
ABSTRACT 
Laura Lepomäki: Peer review networks between Bitcoin traders 
Master of Science Thesis 
Tampere University 
Science and Engineering 
October 2019 
Bitcoin is a cryptocurrency that can be traded online. Some of the online Bitcoin trading platforms allow traders 
to give trust ratings to each other. Trust ratings are meant to indicate with whom to trade. Given and received 
trust ratings between Bitcoin traders form a Bitcoin trader peer review network. Understanding the functionality 
of Bitcoin peer review networks is crucial due to counter-party risk in Bitcoin transactions. This work studies 
the social aspects of Bitcoin trading. Trust rating data from two online Bitcoin trading platforms, Bitcoin OTC 
and Bitcoin Alpha, is used. 
Bitcoin trader behaviour in peer review networks is reduced to five behavioural features: attention, reputation, 
activity, fairness and goodness. The first three are derived from the data in a straightforward way. The last two 
are determined by using a state-of-the-art algorithm designed for trust/distrust networks. Trader types are 
extracted by clustering the traders based on the behavioural features. Due to timestamped data it is possible 
to define how the behaviour of Bitcoin traders evolve over time. Bitcoin peer review networks are represented 
as chronological aggregated snapshots of the underlying temporal system. Per each aggregated network, 
traders are clustered based on their behaviour. Cluster transitions provide information about how Bitcoin trader 
behaviour evolves over time. This work focuses especially on adverse behaviour. Adverse behaviour refers to 
giving unfair trust ratings to others or being distrusted by other traders, especially fair ones. The impact of 
receiving unfair ratings on a trader's behaviour is studied. In addition, it is studied if adversely behaving traders 
form communities. A community is a group of traders who have been rating each other. Behavioural clusters 
are also studied in relation to the most and the least central traders. The most central traders substantially 
contribute to the peer review network while the impact of the least central ones is negligible. 
The behavioural clusters show clear similarities between the datasets. There are trader types for which 
behaviour is exceptionally persistent. For well behaving traders it is common to remain as they are. Distrusted 
traders are likely to remain distrusted or disappear from the network, which can partly be explained by unfair 
negative treatment. Unfairly negatively rated traders can react to unfair treatment by becoming unfair 
themselves. Some of the most reputable traders have received their reputation from unfair positive ratings. 
Active and noticed traders with medium reputation behave in various ways in the future and are likely to stay 
in the network. In addition, it is observed that communities of unfairness and distrust emerge in Bitcoin peer 
review networks the same time with a burst of negative trust ratings. Surprisingly, the results on centrality show 
that the most well behaving traders become the least central. The most central traders in Bitcoin peer review 
networks are active and noticed traders who do not behave adversely. 
Keywords: peer review networks, Bitcoin traders, behavioral clusters 
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Bitcoin on yksi kryptovaluutoista, ja niitä voidaan ostaa ja myydä internetissä. Osa internetissä olevista Bitcoin 
kaupankäyntialustoista tarjoaa mahdollisuuden antaa luottamusarvoja toisille Bitcoin kaupankäyjille. 
Luottamusarvot on tarkoitettu osoittamaan, kenen kanssa kannattaa käydä kauppaa. Saadut ja annetut 
luottamusarvot Bitcoin kaupankäyjien välillä muodostavat vertaisarviointiverkon. Bitcoin vertaisarviointiverkon 
ymmärtäminen on tärkeää, koska kaupankäyntiin liittyy vastapuoliriski. Tässä työssä tutkitaan Bitcoin 
kaupankäynnin sosiaalisia puolia. Työssä käytetään luottamusarvodataa kahdelta Bitcoin 
kaupankäyntialustalta, Bitcoin OTC:ltä ja Bitcoin Alpha:lta. 
Kaupankäyjien käyttäytyminen on redusoitu viiteen käyttäytymisominaisuuteen: huomio, maine, aktiivisuus, 
reiluus ja hyvyys. Ensimmäiset kolme on suoraviivaisesti johdettu datasta. Jälkimmäiset kaksi on määritetty 
käyttäen viimeisintä menetelmää edustavaa algoritmia. Kaupankäyjätyypit on määritetty ryhmittelemällä 
kaupankäyjät klustereihin käyttäytymisominaisuuksien perusteella. Aikamerkityn datan johdosta on 
mahdollista määrittää, kuinka Bitcoin kaupankäyjien käyttäytyminen muuttuu ajan myötä. Ajan kanssa 
muuttuva vertaisarviointiverkko on esitetty kokoamalla verkko kronologisiksi tilannekatsauksiksi. Jokaista 
koottua verkkoa kohden kaupankäyjät on ryhmitelty käyttäytymisen perusteella. Klusterisiirtymistä saadaan 
informaatiota käyttäytymisen muuttumisesta. Työssä keskitytään erityisesti epäsuotuisaan käytökseen. 
Epäsuotuisa käytös tarkoittaa, että kaupankäyjä antaa epäreiluja luottamusarvoja tai on epäluotettu erityisesti 
reilujen kaupankäyjien mielestä. Tässä työssä tutkitaan epäreilujen luottamusarvojen vastaanottamisen 
vaikutusta kaupankäyjän käytökseen. Lisäksi, työssä tutkitaan muodostavatko epäsuotuisasti käyttäytyvät 
kaupankäyjät yhteisöjä. Yhteisöllä tarkoitetaan kaupankäyjien ryhmää, jossa kaupankäyjät ovat antaneet 
toisilleen luottamusarvoja. Käyttäytymisklustereita tutkitaan myös keskeisimpiin kaupankäyjiin nähden. 
Keskeisimmät kaupankäyjät vaikuttavat merkittävästi vertaisarviointiverkkoon, kun taas vähiten keskeisten 
kaupankäyjien vaikutus on merkityksetön. 
Käyttäytymisklustereissa on selkeitä samankaltaisuuksia datajoukkojen välillä. Osa käyttäytymistyypeistä on 
poikkeuksellisen pysyviä. Hyvin käyttäytyville on yleistä säilyä sellaisina. Epäluotetuille kaupankäyjille on 
todennäköistä pysyä epäluotettuina tai lähteä verkosta. Osaltaan se voidaan selittää epäreilulla negatiivisella 
kohtelulla.  Epäreilun negatiivisesti arvioidut kaupankäyjät voivat reagoida epäreiluun kohteluun muuttumalla 
itse epäreilummiksi. Osa maineikkaimmista kaupankäyjistä on saanut maineensa epäreilun positiivisista 
luottamusarvoista. Aktiiviset ja huomioidut kaupankäyjät, joiden maine on keskivertoa, käyttäytyvät eri tavoin 
tulevaisuudessa ja heille on todennäköistä pysyä verkossa. Lisäksi, epäreilujen ja epäluotettujen yhteisöjä 
ilmenee samanaikaisesti negatiivisten luottamusarvojen ryöpyn kanssa. Yllättävästi, suotuisimmin käyttäytyvät 
kaupankäyjät päätyvät vähiten keskeisiksi. Keskeisimmät kaupankäyjät ovat aktiivisia ja huomioituja 
kaupankäyjiä, jotka eivät käyttäydy epäsuotuisasti. 
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11. INTRODUCTION
Interacting with strangers has become more common due to the internet. On the internet,
there are platforms where transactions are made between anonymous participants. To
approach the risk of fraudulent behaviour in such systems, many online platforms allow
participants to give feedback to each other. The feedback a participant has received on
a platform forms the participant’s reputation. This kind of reputation system is stated to
introduce trust between participants and to encourage participants to behave well. [2, 3] In
this work, a group of participants who give feedback to each other is called a peer review
network.
Emotions and intuition play a role in human reactions. In a peer review network a
participant can give feedback to someone who has given feedback to the participant. This
allows one to retaliate negative or unfair feedback by giving back negative feedback.
Previous studies provide results on reactions to unfairness and low reputation. Restaurants
with low reputation are more likely to create fake reviews on an online customer review
platform than restaurants with good reputation [4]. Cheating in a game is more likely
for those who experience unfair treatment in the game [5]. In a game where accepting
an offer is always economically beneficial, people tend to reject strictly unfair offers but
accept offers that are only slightly unfair [6]. In an organization, a group of employees can
react to unfair treatment by dishonest behaviour, if the one behind the unfair treatment is
external to the group [7].
This work studies how participants in peer review networks give and receive feedback. The
peer review networks studied in this work are formed by Bitcoin traders, who have given
trust ratings to each other on online Bitcoin trading platforms. Due to anonymity, a counter-
party risk is present in Bitcoin transactions. To avoid trading with distrustful traders, some
Bitcoin trading platforms allow traders to give trust ratings to each other. Time-stamped
trust ratings can be used to describe Bitcoin trader behaviour and its evolution. In this
work, trader behaviour refers to giving and receiving feedback in a Bitcoin peer review
network. Data on actual trades is not used, and trader behaviour does not refer to how
Bitcoin traders buy and sell Bitcoins. The trust ratings are used to define behavioural
features: attention, reputation, activity, fairness and goodness, using simple methods and a
state-of-the-art algorithm.
The focus of this work is on adverse behaviour. By adverse behaviour it is meant that a
trader is distrusted by others or gives unfair trust ratings to other traders. Based on the
above listed behavioural features, traders are divided into clusters. A cluster is a group of
similarly behaving traders. In this work, a behavioural cluster refers to a group of traders
whose behaviour in terms of giving and receiving feedback is similar. Behavioural clusters
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are used to study how trader behaviour evolves over time and how the traders react to
unfairness. This work searches for answers to the following questions about Bitcoin trader
behaviour:
1. What kind of behavioural clusters are formed from Bitcoin traders?
2. How does a trader’s behaviour in a Bitcoin peer review network change over time?
3. What is the impact of receiving unfair ratings on a trader’s behaviour in a Bitcoin
peer review network?
In addition, topological matters of Bitcoin peer review networks are studied in this work.
If a trader receives unfair or negative ratings from another trader, a reaction might be to
give back similar ratings. This would indicate mutual distrust or retaliation. To examine if
adversely behaving traders have been rating each other, traders are divided into commu-
nities. A community of traders is a group of traders who have been densely rating each
other while rating only few traders from other groups. Communities differ from clusters
in that they are related to network topology, while clusters are related to the behavioural
features. Another network topology related quantity studied in this work is centrality.
Centrality is a measure of a trader’s importance. The most central traders in a peer review
network substantially contribute to the network while the impact of the least central ones
is negligible. This work searches for answers to the following questions about Bitcoin peer
review network topology:
1. Are there communities of adversely behaving traders in Bitcoin peer review networks?
2. How does centrality relate to traders’ behaviour in Bitcoin peer review networks?
The main results show that trader behaviour does not change drastically over time. Traders
who are distrusted by others remain distrusted or disappear from peer review networks.
This type of behaviour can partly be explained by unfair negative feedback. Trusted traders
remain as they are exceptionally often. Traders who actively give trust ratings and receive
many ratings from other traders in a network can behave in various ways in the future but
are likely to stay in the network. In addition, peer review networks contain communities of
adversely behaving traders. When the proportion of highly negative trust ratings increases,
it is observed that unfair and disreputable traders form communities. Furthermore, the
results on centrality are partly counter-intuitive. That is, the most well behaving traders
become the least important unusually often in Bitcoin peer review networks. To become
and remain an important contributor in Bitcoin peer review network one needs to be active,
noticed and not behaving adversely.
1.1 Social Networks
A network is a set of components called nodes and connections or links between them,
called edges. Also the word vertice can be used in place of the word node, the latter
being chosen to be used in this work. There are many structures, phenomena and systems
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in real life that can be represented as a network, one of the most common of which is
the internet. In the internet, computers or groups of computers are represented by nodes
whereas physical links between them are represented by edges. [8]
One type of a network is a social network. A social network is a network where actors,
e.g. individuals, groups or communities, are connected to each other according to some
relationship [9]. This relationship could be for example friendship, co-authorship or
employment, just to mention some. As the name suggests, social networks model social
phenomena. Nodes in a social network represent actors or groups of actors, and edges
represent interactions or relationships between the actors. [8] Typical examples of social
networks are systems such as Facebook and Twitter. Yet the topic covers also networks
that are not necessarily designed to be social networks. [9] For example, online platforms
where people can buy and sell currencies are not related to social relationships as such. All
the same, human interaction is present in such buyer-seller networks, and these networks
can be categorized as social networks. Social networks facilitated by the internet are called
online social networks. Online social networks have gained a lot of attention as a result of
increased supply of data. [9] Networks studied in this thesis can be categorized as online
social networks.
Social network analysis can be divided into two parts: structural analysis and content-based
analysis. Structural analysis refers to understanding arrangement and linkage of the net-
work, including but not limited to investigating communities and centrality. Communities
and centrality are explained in more detail in the next chapter. Also, the evolution of the
network over time can be part of structural analysis. In comparison to structural analysis,
content-based analysis is related to additional information of the network. Many social
networks include large amount of information that can be advantageous for understanding
the nature of the network. For example, a social network platform such as Facebook
contains pictures, text and games that provide a lot of additional data into the analysis.
[9] It is common to combine structural and content-based analysis [9]. Both topological
and social aspects can be taken into account [10, e.g.], which is the approach taken in this
work.
1.2 Bitcoin Peer Review Networks
Cryptocurrency means digital money that is secured by cryptographic procedures. One of
the cryptocurrencies is Bitcoin. Bitcoin was created 2008 by Satoshi Nakamoto and it is
currently probably the most known cryptocurrency [11]. Cryptocurrencies have gained a
lot of attention due to their relatively recent upcoming and revolutionizing nature. There
are other cryptocurrencies than Bitcoin such as Etherium and XRP, yet data used in this
work is related to Bitcoin. Bitcoins are formed in a process where complex mathematical
problems are solved by a network of computers. This is called Bitcoin mining. Those who
lend their computational power to the system are called Bitcoin miners. [12] People who in
turn buy and sell Bitcoins are referred to as Bitcoin traders. In this thesis social networks
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of Bitcoin traders are examined.
Unlike traditional digital currencies and central banking systems, Bitcoin trading does not
have any third party intermediary assuring appropriate handling of transactions. Instead,
Bitcoin is implemented using distributed ledger technology, more specifically block-chain.
In addition, Bitcoin traders are anonymous in a sense that they are not identifiable by other
traders. Thus, Bitcoin trader network functionality is based on a peer-to-peer network,
where transaction history is maintained and verified by Bitcoin miners using block-chain
technology [12, 13, 14]. A known vulnerability of such system is ’51% attack’ where a
group of Bitcoin miners covering more than half of the computational power of the Bitcoin
mining network would be able to control transactions [15].
Technology-wise, Bitcoins cannot be ’double spent’. This is due to a time-stamp server
storing blocks of irreversible transactions to keep track on transaction history verified
by Bitcoin miners. The concept of trust in block-chain based finance is far from being
trivial. It is considered to be shifted instead of excluded in such systems. [12] It is crucial
to understand how trust is embedded in Bitcoin peer review networks. The topic being
extensive, this work is scoped to focus on social aspects. Consequently, technological
matters are not included in the analysis.
There are many platforms where Bitcoins can be traded, of which Bitcoin OTC and Bitcoin
Alpha are the ones whose data is used in this thesis. The two datasets used in this work
are referred to as Bitcoin OTC and Bitcoin Alpha according to the source of the data. On
these platforms traders can give ratings based on how they trust other traders. This type
of rating system is a way to tackle the problem of hiding fraudulent behaviour behind
anonymity. In other words, it gives information about with whom to trade. Naturally there
is a risk of fraudulent traders affecting Bitcoin trading by giving false trust ratings to other
traders. The nature and evolution of Bitcoin peer review networks can be studied from
time-stamped trust rating data. This is important as both technical and social aspects need
to be studied in order to guarantee proper functionality of Bitcoin trading. To approach the
latter, this thesis continues the work of [16, 17] by studying in more detail the behaviour
of Bitcoin traders. Trader behaviour is captured into features derived from trust rating data.
The evolution of trader behaviour over time is possible to analyze due to time-stamped data.
Because other type of data such as executed trades is not included, trader behaviour in
this work is related to given and received trust ratings in a peer review network of Bitcoin
traders. Other type of behaviour is outside the scope of this work.
Datasets used in this work are available online in [18, 1] and introduced in [16, 17].
Links to the actual trading platforms where the datasets are from are provided in [18, 1].
Unfortunately, the link to Bitcoin Alpha trading platform is no longer valid. The datasets
used in this work are considered valid as they are used in previous publications. Both
datasets contain traders numbered by positive integers and trust ratings ranging from −10
up to 10 with a step 1 excluding 0. Rating value 10 represents the highest possible trust,
while −10 means severe distrust. In the datasets there are no repeating ratings meaning
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Table 1.1. The number of traders and trust ratings in Bitcoin OTC and Bitcoin Alpha
datasets are shown in the first columns. ’Time Range’ presents the first and the last
time-stamp in the data. The average number of received, µin, and given, µout, ratings as
well as their variances (σ2in,σ
2
out resp.) rounded to the closest integer are shown in the last
columns.
Dataset Traders Ratings Time Range µin σ
2
in µout σ
2
out
Bitcoin OTC 5881 35592 2010-11-08 - 2016-01-25 6 313 8 533
Bitcoin Alpha 3783 24186 2010-11-08 - 2016-01-22 6 271 7 378
that trader ni gives a trust rating to trader n j once if ever in the data. A trader cannot
give a trust rating to himself/herself. The total number of nodes and edges as well as the
time ranges covered by the datasets are presented in Table 1.1. The mean and variance of
the number of received and given ratings over the traders are also presented in the table.
Accordingly, datasets cover 6 years in total and include thousands of Bitcoin traders. The
number of given and received trust ratings varies significantly between traders.
62. MATHEMATICAL METHODS
Mathematical methods used in answering the research questions are explained in this
chapter. In the first section, the concept of network is introduced with examples. Properties
of networks, and quantities related to nodes are discussed. After that, the concepts of
clustering, community detection and centrality are presented. The methods chosen in this
work are described in more detail. There are many other methods and algorithms related
to the topics of this chapter yet they are left outside the scope of this work. Comparing
for example clustering methods is considered a natural and interesting extend to this work.
The methods used in this work are chosen by their efficiency and suitability, and they are
considered to be a reasonable start for a more elaborate research.
2.1 Network Theory
Networks can be applied to multiple scientific fields ranging from biological food chains
and chemical reaction networks to internet and power grids. The approach in network
theory is to model the underlying system as a network, and to use mathematical methods to
understand its nature. [8] Recently, the study of complex networks has gained importance
due to increased supply of data and computational power. Complex networks are used to
model large, complex systems that change over time. The study of complex networks has
been developed in the context of real networks. [19] The word complex in this context
usually refers to the size of the network but also to the complex nature of the underlying
system. Network components can include additional information, for example there can be
multiple types of edges or various attributes associated to nodes. Complex networks can
be used to model large complicated systems.
Definition 2.1.1 (Network) A network G = (N,E) is a collection of nodes ni ∈ N =
{n1,n2, ...,nk} and edges ei, j ∈ E ⊆ N ×N. An edge ei, j = (ni,n j) represents a connection
from node ni to n j. Nodes ni and n j are called adjacent if (ni,n j) ∈ E or (n j,ni) ∈ E.
Definition 2.1.2 (Undirected Network) An undirected network is a network G = (N,E)
such that
(ni,n j) ∈ E ⇐⇒ (n j,ni) ∈ E.
Definition 2.1.3 (Weighted Network) Let G = (N,E) be a network. G is weighted if
there exists a mapping h : E −→ R
h((ni,n j)) = wi, j,
that assigns a weight for each edge.
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(a) Undirected, weighted network (b) Directed network
Figure 2.1. An illustration of (a) an undirected, weighted network and (b) a directed
network using real data from Bitcoin OTC trading platform [1].
Mathematical definition of a network is presented in Def. 2.1.1. An edge e is defined by
two nodes, ni,n j, representing that there is a connection from ni to n j. Nodes that have
an edge between them are called adjacent. A network can be directed or undirected. In
a directed network, an edge has a direction, i.e. it is going from one node to another. A
network is directed by definition. In an undirected network, connections work both ways as
defined in Def. 2.1.2. Some networks include additional information on top of nodes and
edges. One type of network that is often used is called weighted network. In a weighted
network every edge has a weight associated to it as expressed in Def. 2.1.3. Weight of an
edge or edge weight is usually a real number. Sometimes it is particularly noted that an
edge can have a negative weight. Such networks are called signed networks. Edge weight
can represent for instance the strength of the connection. [8] Networks studied in this work
are directed, signed and weighted.
An example of an undirected, weighted network is shown in Fig. 2.1(a). In the figure,
numbered spheres represent nodes, and lines between them represent edges. Fig. 2.1(b)
presents an example of a directed network. Examples of real world directed networks
include World Wide Web in computer science, protein-protein metabolic network in
biochemistry, citation network in scientific research, and pray-predator food network in
ecology. Collaboration network and road maps are examples of undirected networks.
Some networks can be interpreted as directed or undirected depending on the aspect the
phenomenon is studied from. [8] For instance, a network where people are linked if they
are friends might be considered undirected but could also be interpreted as directed.
Networks are used to model systems related to various scientific fields, as demonstrated by
the above listed examples. It is beneficial to develop general methods and quantities that
can be applied to networks in various contexts. One commonly used quantity of a node in
a network is its degree.
Definition 2.1.4 (Degree) Let G = (N,E) be a network. The degree of a node n, d(n), in
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an undirected network is the number of edges adjacent to that node,
d(n) = |{γ : (n,γ) ∈ E}|,
where | · | is the number of elements in a set. In a directed network, the in-degree of a node
n is the number of in-going edges,
din(n) = |{β : (β ,n) ∈ E}|,
whereas the out-degree of a node n is the number of out-going edges,
dout(n) = |{γ : (n,γ) ∈ E}|.
The degree of a node in a network is defined in Def. 2.1.4. In an undirected network, the
degree of a node can be thought as the number of its neighbors. In a directed network there
are two types of degrees: in-degree and out-degree. The in-degree of a node is the number
of edges coming to the node. Analogously, the out-degree of a node is the number of edges
going from that node to other nodes. [8]
Definition 2.1.5 (Self Loop) Let G = (N,E) be a network. A self loop at node n ∈ N is
(n,n) ∈ E.
A basic property of a network is whether it contains self loops or not. A self loop at a node
means that the node is connected to itself, as defined in Def. 2.1.5. A network that contains
no self loops and has at most one edge from any node ni to another node n j is called a
simple network. [8] Networks studied in this work are simple networks.
Networks can be used to model both static and dynamic systems. Static networks are
networks that do not change over time. They are often used to model systems that
evolve over time relatively slowly. Networks that model slowly changing systems can
be represented as a sequence of static networks. In such an approach, chronological
aggregated snapshots of the network are used to model the underlying slowly evolving
system. Networks that evolve over time are called dynamic or temporal networks. Temporal
networks allow studying how the structure and properties of the underlying dynamic system
changes over time. [9]
In network theory there are various quantities to describe the nodes of a network. Many
times it is necessary to order nodes based on how important and central they are in a
network. This type of node hierarchy can be used for example in finding the most cited
publications in a citation network. Accordingly, one quantity in network analysis is the
centrality of a node. Centrality is a measure of a node’s importance in terms of how
connected the node is to other nodes in a network. Centrality measures are often based on
the degree of a node. In its simplest form, degree can be used as a centrality measure. In
many networks there are a small number of nodes that have exceptionally high degrees.
Such nodes are called hubs. Recent empirical and theoretical studies argue that the hubs of
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a network can have an excessive impact on the behaviour of the network. [8] In a directed
network, centrality can be separated into two types: being central in terms of out-going
and in-going edges. This division allows extracting important source nodes and destination
nodes. An important source node points to many important nodes. Important source node
is called a hub in this context. Important destination node, a so called authority, is pointed
at by many hubs. [20] Centrality is further discussed in section 2.4.
Networks are applied to various problems such as link prediction [16, 21, 22, 23], anomaly
or fraud detection [17, 24, 25, 26] and complex contagion [27, 28, 29]. Link prediction
refers to predicting the emergence, signs and weights of edges in a network [16]. Anomaly
and fraud detection refers to detecting anomalous or fraudulent nodes in a network. For
example, in [26] a method for finding users who give false reviews on an online commerce
platform is developed. Complex contagion is a phenomenon where connected nodes
have an influence on each other. It can mean for example rumours or news spreading
in a network of people [29]. One of the typical tasks related to networks is community
detection. In community detection, nodes are partitioned into groups so that nodes within
a group are highly connected, while nodes in different groups share only few links [8].
Community detection is discussed in more detail in section 2.3.
Systems that are modeled by complex networks usually include a large number of compo-
nents and connections [19]. Such systems are not feasible to analyze without increasing
the level of abstraction. Complex networks are a mathematical tool and thus an abstraction
of the underlying system. Higher abstraction level allows applying general methods and
quantities to a wide range of systems.
2.2 K-Means Clustering
Clustering means grouping samples based on their similarity. It is used to recognize
patterns in data. Clustering is applied in various contexts such as biological analysis, image
processing, and data compression [30, 31, 32]. There are many methods for clustering,
yet on a general level they apply the same idea. At first, a similarity measure needs to be
defined. For instance, Euclidean distance can be used as a similarity measure. Samples are
then partitioned into groups called clusters so that similar samples are placed into the same
cluster. The goal is to find a partition of the samples so that the samples within a cluster
are similar to each other and differ from the samples in other clusters. Representing the
samples in a dataset by clusters is a simplification and thus part of the information is lost
in clustering. [33]
There are various types of clustering such as probabilistic clustering and hierarchical
clustering. In this work, clustering refers to partitioning relocation clustering. In this type
of clustering, samples are grouped into disjoint subsets and the optimal set of subset is
found in an iterative way. Starting from some initial set of subsets, clustering algorithm
reassigns each sample into a cluster based on some criterion. In each iteration the clusters
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are modified based on the reassigned samples. In this way the clustering result is gradually
improved. [33]
The most popular partitioning relocation clustering method is called K-means clustering.
[32] K-means clustering is a fast and simple method that is usually the first one to apply
due to quick implementation [31]. It scales well to large datasets and it is guaranteed
to converge. K-means clustering is technically applicable only with numerical features
[33]. In K-means clustering, samples are divided into k clusters, C1,C2, ...,Ck, where k is
a predefined positive integer. Each cluster is represented by a so called centroid that is
the center of the cluster. Each cluster center lies in the same space with the samples but
is not necessarily any of the samples. Initial cluster centers can be randomly chosen or
defined based on a more advanced technique. Each sample is clustered based on the closest
cluster center to the sample. After dividing the samples into clusters, each cluster center is
changed to be the mean of the samples in the cluster. The approach in K-means clustering
is to minimize the squared distance of samples to their closest cluster center. [34]
A commonly used solution for finding a local minimum in K-means clustering is introduced
in [35] and referred to as Lloyd’s algorithm. In Lloyd’s algorithm cluster centers are
initialized by randomly uniformly choosing k samples from the total sample set. The
procedure in Lloyd’s algorithm can be described by the following steps [34]:
1. Define the number of clusters, k.
2. Initialize the cluster centers, µ
(0)
k .
3. Consider the j:th iteration. Assign each sample z to the cluster of its closest cluster
center:
z ∈Ck = argmin
Ck
||z−µ
( j−1)
k ||,
where || · || is a distance measure.
4. Update each cluster center to be the mean of the samples in that cluster:
∀k : µ
( j)
k =
1
|Ck|
∑
z∈Ck
z,
where |Ck| is the number of samples in cluster Ck.
5. Repeat steps 3 and 4 until the cluster centers do not change significantly:
∑
k
⃓⃓⃓
µ
( j)
k −µ
( j−1)
k
⃓⃓⃓
< ε,
where ε is a predefined tolerance.
The above described algorithm can be efficiently run with different values for initialization
parameters and the best result can be picked in order to avoid ending up in a poor local
minimum [31, 30]. Also, more advanced cluster center initialization methods have been
developed as random initialization may lead to a poor clustering result [32]. Initialization
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method introduced in [34] increases the speed and the accuracy of K-means algorithm.
This modified version of K-means is referred to as K-means++. In K-means++ cluster
centers are initialized according to specific probabilities. That is, a sample is chosen as
a cluster center with a probability proportional to the distance from the sample to the
existing cluster centers. The first cluster center is arbitrarily chosen among the samples.
This initialization method is used in this work.
Definition 2.2.1 (Within Cluster Sum of Squares) Denote a list of M samples by Z =
(z1,z2, ...,zM). Let the samples be clustered into K clusters, C1,C2, ...,CK . Within cluster
sum of squares, W, is
W =
K
∑
k=1
∑
zi∈Ck
||zi −µk||
2,
where µk is the cluster center of the k:th cluster and || · || refers to a chosen distance/simi-
larity measure.
Clusters are not defined in advance. It is not known beforehand how the samples should
be divided into clusters. K-means clustering can end up in a different local minimum
depending on the initialization, which points out that there are multiple ways to cluster the
samples. Hence there needs to be a way to measure the validity of the clustering result. One
way to measure the similarity of samples within clusters is within cluster sum of squares
(WCSS). WCSS is defined in Def. 2.2.1. The smaller the value for WCSS, the more
similar the samples within clusters are. K-means clustering is designed to minimize WCSS
[31, 32]. By design of the K-means method, WCSS decreases as the number of clusters
increases. Increasing the number of clusters comes with a cost of complexity. Because
the goal of clustering is to simplify data, increasing the number of clusters complicates
analysis and interpretation. The need to define the number of clusters in advance is one of
the drawbacks in K-means clustering. One way to decide k is to plot WCSS against the
number of clusters. Usually the curve drops rapidly at the beginning but decreases only a
little when the values for k increase. Based on the curve, one can see the trade off between
accuracy and complexity. The number of clusters can then be decided on a case-by-case
basis.
2.3 Community Detection
Community detection is one of the most central topics in the study of complex networks
[36]. Community detection means partitioning nodes in a network into groups or com-
munities based on their linkage. The idea is that nodes within a community are highly
linked to each other while nodes in different communities share only few links. Com-
munity detection is used to discover structurally related units not known in advance. [9]
An example of a community is a group of friends in a social network of acquaintances.
In community detection nodes are divided into disjoint subsets, a subset representing a
group of actors or items that are densilty connected to each other. Community detection
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algorithms are designed to discover the optimal set of subsets based on some criterion.
A common criterion is to maximize a so called modularity. Modularity is a measure of
how inter-connected communities are compared to the connections between communities.
Optimizing modularity is known to be computationally hard. Consequently, approximation
algorithms are used for modularity based community detection for large networks. [37]
One of the often used modularity based community detection method is Louvain commu-
nity detection. This method was first introduced in [37] to detect communities in large,
weighted, undirected networks. There are solutions for other types of networks too, e.g.
signed network community detection is discussed in [38]. In this work, the signs, weights
and directions of edges are dropped in community detection. This is to extract commu-
nities of traders purely from the structural perspective. Knowledge of given trust ratings
is discarded and edges are used to represent interactions between traders. In other words,
peer review networks of Bitcoin traders are simplified to show which traders interact with
each other without referring to the type of the interaction. Dropping the edge weights
means in practice that each edge has a weight 1. Due to this simplification, more complex
community detection methods are not needed. Louvain community detection is chosen in
this work based on its efficiency, suitability and easy implementation.
Consider an arbitrary undirected, weighted network G = (N,E,h((·, ·))), where h is a
mapping that assigns a weight for each edge (see Def.2.1.3). In our case
∀(ni,n j) ∈ E : h((ni,n j)) = wi, j = 1.
Denote the number of nodes by |N|. Louvain community detection has two iterative phases.
First, each node is assigned to a different community. Hence there are |N| communities at
the beginning. The following notations are used in defining modularity:
• ωi: the community of node ni,
• δ (ωi,ω j): a function having value 1 if ωi = ω j and 0 otherwise,
• η : the sum of all the edge weights, η = ∑(ni,n j)∈E wi, j,
• ∑G,ni : the sum of the weights of the edges between node ni and its adjacent nodes in
network G.
Modularity is calculated as Q = 1
2η ∑i, j
[︄
wi, j −
∑G,ni ∑G,n j
2η
]︄
δ (ωi,ω j).
Per each node ni ∈ N the gain in modularity is calculated in cases of moving the node to
the communities of its adjacent nodes. Node ni is then moved to the community of the
adjacent node that maximizes modularity gain. If modularity cannot be increased, node ni
is left in its current community. [37]
The above described notations together with the following notations are used in defining
the gain in modularity:
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• Ω: a community,
• ∑Ω: the sum of the edge weights within community Ω,
• ∑G,Ω: the sum of the weights of the edges in network G that are incident to the nodes
in community Ω,
• ∑Ω,ni : the sum of the weights of the edges between node ni and its adjacent nodes in
community Ω.
The gain in modularity, ∆Q, when a node ni is moved to community Ω, can be calculated
efficiently by
∆Q =
[︄
∑Ω+∑Ω,ni
2η
−
(︄
∑G,Ω+∑G,ni
2η
)︄2]︄
−
[︄
∑Ω
2η
−
(︄
∑G,Ω
2η
)︄2
−
(︄
∑G,ni
2η
)︄2]︄
.
After moving each node according to the maximum modularity gain, the process starts
again. Iterations stop when no more modularity gain can be achieved. In this way, a local
maximum for modularity is found in the first phase. [37]
In the second phase, a new network is formed. In the new network nodes are the communi-
ties constructed in the first phase. Edge weights between the nodes in the new network are
formed by summing up the weights of the edges between the communities. Since each
community contains inter-connections, the new network contains self loops. The weight
of the self loop edge of community Ω is the sum of the weights of the inter-connections
in Ω. Using the above notations, the self loop weight of community Ω is ∑Ω. The first
phase is then applied to the new network. That is, communities of communities are formed
by making single changes at a time and stopping when modularity cannot be increased
anymore. The two phases together are referred to as a pass. Louvain community detection
iterates the passes until modularity changes no more. In this way, a local maximum for
modularity is achieved in an iterative way. Louvain community detection is applicable
to large datasets due to its efficiency. One of the drawbacks in Louvain community de-
tection is that the communities formed in the first phase are sensitive to the order of the
nodes. The impact of the order of the nodes on modularity is stated to be insignificant but
computational time is assumed to be affected. [37]
2.4 Centrality
Centrality is a quantity that describes how important a node is in a network. Nodes can
be ranked by centrality, and the received node hierarchy can serve as a tool for network
analysis. Especially in social networks, centrality is used to highlight the most influential
nodes. There are many ways to define centrality. Degree centrality refers to determining
a node’s importance based on how connected it is to other nodes. Eigenvector centrality
advances degree centrality by considering how connected a node is to important nodes.
[8] Some of the centrality methods have been developed in the context of internet search
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engines. Search engines rank web pages based on how well they fit the entry given by a
web user. Algorithms such as Hyperlink-Induced Topic Search (HITS) [20], Page Rank
[39] and its relatively recently modified version Quantum Page Rank [40] have all been
developed for search engines. Yet, they are used as centrality measures in other contexts
too [41, 42, e.g.]. There are also centrality measures that use other information in addition
to network structure to define the most central nodes. For example, in the context of
internet search engines, a modified version of Page Rank and HITS methods includes web
page topics into centrality method [43].
In this work, only the directed edges are used to rank Bitcoin traders by their importance.
The underlying rationale is that highly connected traders have the greatest influence on
the peer review network because they have given and/or received many trust ratings.
Incorporating edge weights, namely trust rating values, is not desired as the aim is to see
how structural matters relate to the behaviour of the traders. Centrality measures that
include additional content are not relevant in this case. Many centrality measures such
as Page Rank assign one centrality value per each node in a network but HITS centrality
measure divides centrality into two categories: hubs and authorities. Because the networks
in this work are directed, HITS centrality method is suitable in this context. HITS is
considered to be more informative than e.g. Page Rank because it provides two types of
centrality measures.
HITS is introduced in [20] as a method for ranking web pages according to an input
given by an internet search engine user. The idea behind HITS algorithm is that there
are two types of important web pages: authorities that contain relevant information and
hubs that point to authorities, i.e. tell where to find the information [9]. In the context of
Bitcoin peer review networks authorities are traders that have received many trust ratings,
especially from hubs. Authorities are known traders and a lot of information about their
trustworthiness is available. Hubs in Bitcoin peer review networks are traders that have
given ratings to many others, especially authorities. Hubs are traders that considerably
contribute to the discussion of "with whom to trade".
HITS algorithm defines an authority and a hub values for each node in a network in an
iterative way. The higher the hub (authority) value of a node is the more important hub
(authority) the node is. Denote the hub value of node ni by φ(ni) and the authority value
by θ(ni). Denote by Nni,out the set of nodes node ni points to, and by Nni,in the set of nodes
that point to node ni. A predefined threshold ε determines the upper limit for how much
the values can change between consecutive iterations for the algorithm to stop. With these
notations the HITS procedure finds hub an authority values per each node in a network the
following way:
• Consider a directed network G = (N,E).
• Initialize all hub and authority values to 1:
∀ni ∈ N : φ
(0)(ni) = θ
(0)(ni) = 1.
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• Consider the k:th iteration. Per each node ni ∈ N, the authority value of ni from the
k−1:th iteration is increased by the hub values of the nodes in Nni,in:
∀ni ∈ N : θ
(k)(ni) = θ
(k−1)(ni)+ ∑
n j∈Nni,in
φ (k−1)(n j).
• Per each node ni ∈ N, the hub value of ni is increased by the new authority values of
the nodes in Nni,out:
∀ni ∈ N : φ
(k)(ni) = φ
(k−1)(ni)+ ∑
n j∈Nni,out
θ (k)(n j).
• Before the next iteration, the hub (authority) values of the nodes are normalized by
dividing the values by the current maximum hub (authority) value.
• The algorithm iterates until the values change less than a certain tolerance ε . When
the stopping criterion is met, hub (authority) values are normalized by the sum of
the hub (authority) values over all nodes. The output of the HITS algorithm is the
normalized hub and authority values from the most recent iteration.
Above described HITS procedure is presented after NetworkX Python package’s implemen-
tation of HITS algorithm [44]. HITS algorithm that includes normalization is guaranteed
to converge [45].
2.5 Hyper-Geometeric Test
Hyper-geometric test is a statistical test related to hyper-geometric distribution. Hyper-
geometric distribution is a discrete distribution that presents probabilities for a number of
successes. Following the example in [46], hyper-geometric distribution can be explained
by considering an urn of k balls of which m are blue and k−m are white. If K balls are
drawn without replacement, the number of blue ones, M, is a a hyper-geometric random
variable with parameters k,m and K. The probability of M successes, namely M blue balls,
is
P(X = M) =
(︁
m
M
)︁(︁
k−m
K−M
)︁
(︁
k
K
)︁ .
The probability of observing M blue balls signals how exceptional the result is. In this
sense, hyper-geometric distribution can be used to point out exceptional observations.
Hyper-geometric test refers to testing over-representation or under-representation of a
certain type of objects under the null-hypothesis of random occurrence [47] In case of
over-representation, hyper-geometric distribution is used to determine the probability of
having at least M successes,
P(M ≤ X) = 1−
M−1
∑
i=0
P(X = i) = 1−
M−1
∑
i=0
(︁
m
i
)︁(︁
k−m
K−i
)︁
(︁
k
K
)︁ .
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In the example, hyper-geometric test has the null-hypothesis that at least M blue balls are
observed as a result of randomly sampling K balls without replacement from an urn that
contains m blue balls and k balls in total.
In statistical tests, a significance level, α , is the tolerance for falsely rejecting a null-
hypothesis. For instance, α = 0.05 means that there is less than 5% chance the null-
hypothesis holds true even if it is rejected. Comparing probability P(·) to a given sig-
nificance level determines if the null-hypothesis is rejected or not. In this example,
P(M ≤X)< 0.05 would result in the rejection of the null-hypothesis. Under-representation
is tested in a similar manner by calculating the probability of observing at most M samples
of a certain type,
P(X ≤ M) =
M
∑
i=0
P(X = i) =
M
∑
i=0
(︁
m
i
)︁(︁
k−m
K−i
)︁
(︁
k
K
)︁ .
Hyper-geometric test can be used to determine if a result is statistically significant. Statisti-
cal significance in this context means rejecting the null-hypothesis that the observed result
is due to random sampling from the population.
In case there are multiple hyper-geometric tests of the same event, it is crucial to adjust the
significance level accordingly. This is to avoid falsely rejecting null-hypotheses. There are
multiple ways to adjust the significance level, one of which is Bonferronig correction. [48]
In Bonferroni correction the significance level, α , is divided by the number of tests [47].
In case the above described example is repeated 5 times, Bonferroni corrected significance
level, αˆ , would be
αˆ =
0.05
5
= 0.01.
Bonferroni correction is stated to be conservative [47] in a sense that it quite significantly
decreases α with respect to the number of tests. In this work the focus is on strong evidence
due to the large extend of the topic. Research questions are answered from the perspective
of highly exceptional observations. Therefore, Bonferroni correction is considered suitable.
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3. FEATURE EXTRACTION
In this chapter the representation of the peer review networks and features derived from
the trust rating data are explained. The features are used to assess the behaviour of Bitcoin
traders in peer review networks. More advanced features are explained in more detail. The
research methodology used in this thesis is explained and the methods introduced in the
previous chapter are put into the context of answering the research questions.
3.1 Aggregated Network
One of the main questions in network analysis is whether the network is considered
static or dynamic. Having time-stamped data does not necessarily mean that a dynamic
interpretation would be the most suitable. The majority of social network analysis uses
static networks. If a network is evolving over time relatively slowly it might be useful
to interpret it as consecutive snapshots of the changing network. [9] That is, consecutive
events of edges and nodes emerging and disappearing would be batched into a snapshot
representing a dynamic network as a static aggregation over a certain time interval. A
reason to choose such an approach is that analysis of slowly changing networks might not
benefit from incorporating its dynamics to the extend to which it adds complexity.
In this work, it is decided to aggregate the time-stamped data per half a year and represent
the evolution over time of the network as a sequence of snapshots. In this way, both
datasets cover 12 time-steps in total, starting from the second half of 2010 and ending after
the first half of 2016. For example, aggregated data on date 2012-12-31 includes all ratings
given from the 1st of July 2012 until and including 31st of December 2012. The time-steps
are enumerated from 1 to 12. Each time-step corresponds to a time-stamp. For instance,
the fifth time-step has a time-stamp 2012-12-31. In this way, the 12 aggregated networks
correspond to non-overlapping time periods denoted by the end dates of the time periods.
Definition 3.1.1 (Aggregated Network) Aggregated network corresponding to a time-
stamp t is defined by
Gt = (Nt ,Et ,ht),
where Et is the set of edges and Nt is the set of traders present in the peer review network
on a half a year time period ending at date t. Mapping ht((ni,n j)) assigns a rating value
for each edge (ni,n j) ∈ Et .
Aggregated network is defined in Def. 3.1.1. The concept of weighted network (see
Def.2.1.3) is applied in defining aggregated network. That is, there is a function associated
to the network that maps each edge to a trust rating. In other words, ht((ni,n j)) is the
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(a) Bitcoin OTC (b) Bitcoin Alpha
Figure 3.1. The sub-figures present the rating distributions on each time-step in (a) Bitcoin
OTC and (b) Bitcoin Alpha. Trust ratings are integer numbers from -10 to 10 with a step
of 1 excluding 0. The titles of the sub-figures show the number of traders, the number of
ratings and the time-stamp of the aggregated network.
rating value given by trader ni to trader n j in an aggregated network corresponding to a
time-stamp t. As the two datasets used in this work are handled separately, there are two
sequences of 12 aggregated networks.
Figure 3.1 shows the rating distribution in each aggregated network. It is evident that the
overall rating behaviour does not change dramatically over time although the number of
traders varies significantly. For example, in Bitcoin OTC there are less than 50 traders at
the lowest and around 1800 at the highest. Highly negative values, namely -10 ratings,
start to appear after the first half a year, increasing quite remarkably during the second
half of 2012. In Bitcoin OTC −10 ratings cover nearly 20 percent of all the ratings during
the second half of 2013 as seen in Fig. 3.1(a). In Bitcoin Alpha, the proportion of −10
ratings stays below 10% over all time-steps according to Fig.3.1(b). Slightly positive
values, namely +1 and +2, seem to dominate in both datasets covering always more than
50 percent of the ratings.
3.2 Feature Vector
The datasets used in this thesis contain nodes and time-stamped weighted edges. Therefore
they provide only the basic information to build the networks in the first place. However,
there is a way to derive additional information from weighted edges. In recent studies,
node behaviour is reduced to two novel features defined by the in-going and out-going
weighted edges of a network. The same datasets that are used in this work are studied in the
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context of fraudulent user detection and link prediction. [16, 17] This work builds on top
of the existing research by adding more features into the analysis. This thesis contributes
to the research on online social networks by studying how the features evolve over time
and relate to the topological quantities of peer review networks.
Features are derived from the trust rating data to extract trader behaviour. Trader behaviour
refers to how traders rate each other and get rated by others in a peer review network. The
numbers and the values of given and received ratings are used to describe the behaviour
of the traders. Trader behaviour consists of five features, and the features are calculated
separately for each trader in each aggregated network.
First, the lists of given and received ratings are defined.
Definition 3.2.1 (Given and Received Ratings) Consider an aggregated network Gt =
(Nt ,Et ,ht). Let n be an arbitrary trader, n ∈ Nt . Denote the traders who have given ratings
to n by β
(1)
n ,β
(2)
n , ...,β
(Mn)
n , where Mn = din(n) (see Def. 2.1.4). The list of ratings n has
received from other traders is
Xn,t = (ht((β
(1)
n ,n)), ...,ht((β
(Mn)
n ,n))).
Denote the traders who have received ratings from n by γ
(1)
n ,γ
(2)
n , ...,γ
(Kn)
n , where Kn =
dout(n) The list of ratings n has given to other traders is
Yn,t = (ht((n,γ
(1)
n )), ...,ht((n,γ
(Kn)
n ))).
Definition 3.2.1 presents how the lists of given and received ratings are denoted. These
lists are used in defining some of the features. One of the five features is attention.
Definition 3.2.2 (Attention) Consider an aggregated network Gt = (Nt ,Et ,ht). Let n be
an arbitrary trader, n ∈ Nt . The attention of trader n is defined by the number of ratings n
has received,
at(n) = din(n).
The attention of a trader is defined by the number of ratings the trader has received as
presented in Def. 3.2.2. Attention is used to describe how noticed a trader is by other
traders. A trader with a high attention value has got feedback from many others about
how trusted the trader is. Attention is zero at the lowest and |Nt |−1 the highest, where
|Nt | is the number of traders in Gt . In case trader n has only given ratings to others and
not received any, at(n) = 0. If trader n has been rated by all other traders in the network,
at(n) = |Nt |−1.
Another feature based on the received ratings is reputation. Reputation describes how
trusted a trader is by other traders.
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Definition 3.2.3 (Reputation) Consider an aggregated network Gt = (Nt ,Et ,ht). Let n
be an arbitrary trader, n ∈ Nt . Let Xn,t be the list of ratings n has received as defined in Def.
3.2.1. The reputation of trader n is defined by the average of the ratings n has received,
rt(n) =
{︄
1
din(n)
∑x∈Xn,t x, if din(n) ̸= 0
0, otherwise.
The reputation of a trader, defined in Def.3.2.3, is the average of the ratings the trader has
received. As the rating values range from -10 to 10, reputation is -10 the lowest and 10 the
highest. The higher the reputation the more trusted the trader is. If a trader has no received
ratings, reputation is set to zero.
Per each aggregated network all the ratings given by a trader define the trader’s activity.
Activity measures how actively a trader gives ratings to others.
Definition 3.2.4 (Activity) Consider an aggregated network Gt = (Nt ,Et ,ht). Let n be an
arbitrary trader, n ∈ Nt . The activity of trader n is defined by the number of ratings n has
given,
ct(n) = dout(n).
As defined in Def.3.2.4, the activity of a trader is the number of ratings the trader has given
to other traders. Activity is zero the lowest and |Nt |−1 the highest. In case a trader has
only received ratings, activity is zero.
The above described features are intuitive in a sense that they are easy to calculate and
interpret, and they provide information about traders’ behaviour in peer review networks.
In addition to attention, reputation and activity, more advanced features are used to capture
how in line the rating behaviour of a trader is with other traders. Fairness and goodness
reflect how a trader’s received and given ratings associate to the general opinion [16]. The
general opinion in this context means taking all the ratings in an aggregated network into
account. The underlying assumption is that the wisdom of crowd is not biased. In other
words, taking all the ratings into account, it is assumed to be possible to extract how fair
and good the traders are.
Definition 3.2.5 (Fairness and Goodness) Consider an aggregated network Gt =(Nt ,Et ,ht).
Let n be an arbitrary trader, n ∈ Nt . Let Xn,t ,Yn,t be the lists of received and given ratings
respectively as defined in Def. 3.2.1. In accordance with Def. 3.2.1, the number of elements
in Xn,t and Yn,t is Mn and Kn respectively. Let the ratings be scaled to range from −1 to 1.
The fairness, ft , and the goodness, gt , of n are defined by [16]
ft(n) = 1−
1
Kn
Kn
∑
i=1
⃓⃓⃓
ht((n,γ
(i)
n ))−gt(γ
(i)
n )
⃓⃓⃓
2
,
gt(n) =
1
Mn
Mn
∑
i=1
ft(β
(i)
n )ht((β
(i)
n ,n)).
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Fairness and goodness are defined in 3.2.5. Fairness measures how fairly a trader has given
ratings to other traders. Goodness presents fairness weighted reputation. By definition the
value range for goodness is from -1 to 1 and for fairness from 0 to 1 due to scaled rating
values. As shown in the definition, fairness is used to define goodness and the other way
around. These features are calculated in an iterative way from one another. [16]
The algorithm for calculating fairness and goodness values is presented in [16] and its
Python implementation can be downloaded from [49]. In this work, the ratings are scaled to
range from -1 to 1, and the algorithm takes an aggregated network as input. The algorithm
returns the fairness and goodness of each trader in a network. At the beginning, all traders
are given the maximum fairness value. Therefore, the underlying procedure is to interpret
traders as maximally fair unless otherwise can be stated based on the given ratings. The
goodness of a trader is initialized by the average of the ratings received by the trader. If
a trader has only given ratings and not received any, the value for goodness is zero. In
this way, the initial values for goodness equal reputation, when reputation is calculated
using scaled ratings. The algorithm iterates until the sums of the differences of fairness and
goodness values to the values on the previous iteration are less than a predefined tolerance,
ε . In this work, ε = 10−6.
Per each iteration, goodness of trader n is the average over the ratings n has received
weighted by the raters’ fairness from the previous iteration. The updated goodness values
are then used to update each trader’s fairness. That is, each rating trader n has given is
compared to the goodness values of the rated traders. The fairness of trader n is then
the maximum fairness value, namely 1, decreased by the average amount of which the
ratings given by n differ from the goodness values of the rated traders. The goodness of a
trader captures how trusted the trader is especially by fair traders. The fairness of a trader
describes how in line with the general opinion the trust ratings given by the trader are. In
case a trader has no received ratings, goodness is set to zero, thereby in line with reputation.
In case a trader has not given any ratings, fairness is set to 1.
The above described five features are gathered per each trader in an aggregated network to
form traders’ feature vectors.
Definition 3.2.6 (Feature Vector) Consider an aggregated network Gt = (Nt ,Et ,ht). Let
n be an arbitrary trader, n ∈ Nt . The feature vector of trader n is:
zt(n) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
at(n)
rt(n)
ct(n)
ft(n)
gt(n)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ ,
where at(·), rt(·), ct(·), ft(·) and gt(·) are the attention, reputation, activity, fairness and
goodness of the trader respectively.
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(a) Bitcoin OTC
(b) Bitcoin Alpha
Figure 3.2. The sub-figures present the unscaled feature values over all traders and time-
steps for (a) Bitcoin OTC and (b) Bitcoin Alpha. The feature value distributions are shown
separately per each feature: reputation, goodness, fairness, activity and attention starting
from left. The captions show the names, and the minimum and maximum values of the
features. The feature values are shown on the x-axis and the number of traders is shown
on the y-axis.
Feature vector is defined in Def. 3.2.6. If a trader is present on more than one of the
time-steps, there is a sequence of chronological feature vectors that represent how the
trader’s behaviour evolves over time. Representing traders by feature vectors serves as a
method to study how the traders behave with respect to each other and how their behaviour
evolves over time.
The unscaled feature values over all traders and all 12 aggregated networks are shown
in Fig. 3.2. Based on Fig. 3.2, the most of the traders share similar feature values.
First impression is therefore, that the most of the traders behave similarly. Yet, it is the
combination of features that describes trader behaviour. Also, there are values pointing
out differing and adverse behaviour. That is, based on e.g. Fig. 3.2(b) traders with highly
negative goodness are observed in the data. In addition, a small group of traders are notably
more active than the rest. This is also the case with attention.
Trader behaviour is reduced to a 5 dimensional feature vector (Def. 3.2.6) derived from the
trust rating data. Due to anonymity and having data only on trust ratings this is a problem
of partially hidden information. As there is no ground truth available about the behaviour
of the traders, the analysis is based on relative rather than absolute values. Feature value
quantiles are used to extract different types of traders. For instance, unfair traders are
those among the lowest with respect to fairness. Active traders in turn are those among the
highest with respect to activity. Dividing feature values into quantiles is discussed more in
the next chapter.
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3.3 Feature Correlations
As a first step to address the behavioural features, feature correlation is calculated. This is
to see if there exists linear dependence between the features.
Definition 3.3.1 (Pearson Correlation between Features) Denote the lists of the values
of two features by Vi = (vi,1,vi,2, ...,vi,M) and Vj = (v j,1,v j,2, ...,v j,M). Pearson correlation,
ρ , between the features is
ρ(Vi,V j) =
∑
M
k=1(vi,k −µi)(v j,k −µ j)
σviσv j
,
where µi and µ j are the means,
µi =
1
M
M
∑
k=1
vi,k,
and σi, σ j are the standard deviations,
σi =
⌜⃓⃓
⎷ M∑
k=1
(vi,k −µi)2,
of the feature values in Vi and Vj respectively.
Pearson correlation, defined in 3.3.1, is a continuous measure ranging from −1 to 1. It
represents how much variables linearly depend on each other. Correlation value 0 means
that the variables do not show any linear relationship. Velues 1 and −1 refer to the highest
possible positive and negative linear dependency respectively. Pearson correlation does
not uncover nonlinear relationships. [50]
Feature correlations on the same time-step, averaged over all time-steps, are shown in
Fig. 3.3. The correlations are similar between the datasets. Reputation correlates highly
positively with goodness, which is expected from the way goodness is constructed. Also,
attention and activity show high positive correlation, yet correlation between them varies
the most. Interestingly, the mean correlation between fairness and the other features is
negative. Negative correlation between fairness and activity might stem from construction
since traders with no given ratings are given the maximum fairness.
Correlations of the current feature values with the previous ones are shown in Fig. 3.4. The
correlation values are calculated per each time-step by taking the traders who exist also
on the next time-step and averaging correlations over time. As shown in the Fig. 3.4, the
current feature values mainly correlate with their own previous values. The correlations
with other features do not differ significantly from the correlations in Fig. 3.3 that show
the current feature correlations. The fact that the a features on time-step i correlate with
their own values on time-step i+ 1 indicates that trader behaviour is persistent as the
corresponding time periods are not overlapping. Due to averaging over all traders and
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(a) Bitcoin OTC
(b) Bitcoin Alpha
Figure 3.3. Correlation between the features is calculated per each of the 12 time-steps.
Heat maps show the mean (left) and the standard deviation (right) of the correlations over
the time-steps for (a) Bitcoin OTC and (b) Bitcoin Alpha. The color bars next to each
sub-figure show how the colors correspond to the correlation values.
time-steps, correlation can only be thought as the first glimpse into the behaviour of the
traders. To conclude, based on the correlations, most of the features do not depend linearly
on each other. An exception that does not stem from the way the features are constructed,
is that attention positively correlates with activity. The results are similar between the
datasets.
3.4 Methodology
Modeling can be about explaining or predicting [51]. The focus of this thesis is on
explaining. This work contributes to the research on social trust and distrust networks.
These types of networks have been studied in the context of for example link prediction
[16, 52] and fraud detection [17, 26]. One a general level, the focus of this work is
on studying human behaviour in the context of receiving and giving feedback. More
specifically, this work analyzes Bitcoin trader behaviour in peer review networks. The
analysis focuses on observing how trader behaviour, especially adverse behaviour, evolves
over time. By adverse behaviour it is meant that a trader gives unfair ratings to others
or receives negative ratings from other traders, especially from fair traders. The main
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(a) Bitcoin OTC
(b) Bitcoin Alpha
Figure 3.4. Correlation between feature values on consecutive time-steps is shown for (a)
Bitcoin OTC and (b) Bitcoin Alpha. The columns show how each feature correlates with
the previous values of the features. Suffix ’_lag1’ is added to the names of the previous
features. The sub-figures show the mean (left) and the standard deviation (right) of the
correlations. The color bars next to each sub-figure show how the colors correspond to the
correlation values.
trader types are extracted by clustering the feature vectors using K-means clustering. A
behavioural cluster is assigned to each trader in each aggregated network. Clustering serve
as a method to raise abstraction level in order to understand trader types without explaining
individual cases. Part of the information is lost in clustering as a trader belonging to a
certain cluster might not be fully represented by the properties of the cluster. Yet, this
method allows to extract more general observations on trader behaviour.
The consequences of traders’ behaviour in Bitcoin peer review networks are analysed
from the perspective of the behavioural clusters. Over the aggregated networks, traders
can move from one cluster to another, stay in the same cluster or leave the peer review
network. Per each trader a cluster pattern, that is a chronological sequence of cluster
transitions, is recorded. The consequences of trader behaviour are then analyzed from the
perspective of exceptional cluster transitions. Exceptional cluster transitions are found
using hyper-geometric test. For example, a consequence of adverse behaviour could be
that an unfair trader loses his/her own reputation. This would indicate that unfairness is
punished by reputation lost. The functionality of Bitcoin peer review networks can be
questioned in case the results show no consequences for adverse behaviour.
It is also studied how receiving unfair ratings from others impacts a trader’s behaviour. The
difference between a trader’s reputation and goodness is used to determine if the trader is
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comparably unfairly rated. Exceptional cluster transitions among the unfairly rated traders
are then analysed to see how these traders react to unfair treatment. A reaction could be
for example that an unfairly rated trader rates others more unfairly afterwards. This would
indicate that unfairly rated traders are likely to retaliate unfairness. In an online Bitcoin
trading platform traders only see the given trust ratings, which provide information about
traders’ reputation. Based on the trust ratings, a trader can then decide with whom to trade.
Fairness of a trader cannot be seen from the trust ratings as clearly as reputation, which
in a sense makes it a hidden feature for traders. It is interesting to explore, how receiving
unfair ratings affects a trader’s behaviour, as it points out the impact of unfair traders.
In addition, it is studied how the behavioural clusters relate to certain topological quantities
of peer review networks. An emotional and intuitive response of a trader to receiving
unfair or negative ratings could be that the trader gives back similar ratings. Reasons
for such a reaction could be mutual distrust or the need to retaliate undesired treatment.
It is explored if there are communities of adversely behaving traders, as it would mean
these traders have been rating each other. A community of adversely behaving traders
would indicate that unfair or negative ratings go both ways. In case adversely behaving
traders do not form communities, the datasets would not provide evidence for mutual
distrust or retaliation. Communities are extracted per each of the 12 aggregated network
using Louvain community detection algorithm. The fourth research question: ”Are
there communities of adversely behaving traders in Bitcoin peer review networks?”, is
answered by analyzing how traders in the clusters of adverse behaviour are divided into
communities. Hyper-geometric test is used to highlight the communities with exceptional
cluster proportions. For example, consider a cluster C j contains highly disreputable traders.
In case a community containing unusually many traders from C j existed in a network, a
community of mutual distrust would be found in the network.
It is also studied how centrality relates to the behavioural clusters. HITS centrality
algorithm is used to define hub and authority values per each trader in each aggregated
network. The impact of a trader’s previous behaviour on centrality in the next time-step is
assessed by studying the cluster proportions among the most and the least central traders.
By this way it is possible to evaluate if a certain type of behaviour serves as a strategy
to gain centrality. For instance, one could expect that reputable traders would end up
among the highest in centrality unusually often. Also, the current clusters of traders
with the highest and the lowest possible hub and authority values are studied to see how
centrality relates to traders’ current behaviour. By construction, traders with high activity
and attention values are likely to be the hubs and the authorities in the network. It is
interesting to see what kind of a role for example fairness and goodness play in centrality.
Consider that clusters Ci and C j contain active traders so that traders in Ci are ungood and
traders in C j are good. If the hubs in a network were unusually often from cluster C j but
not so for cluster Ci, it would indicate that goodness is positively related to centrality. The
fifth research question: ”How does centrality relate to traders’ behaviour in Bitcoin peer
review networks?”, is answered by finding the over-represented clusters among the most
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and the least central traders.
In short, trust rating data is used to extract features that form a trader’s feature vector. The
feature vectors are used in clustering the traders based on their behaviour. The focus of
this work is mostly on adversely behaving traders and unfairly rated traders. Clusters in
aggregated networks provide a way to analyze exceptional cluster transitions. Communities
in each aggregated network are extracted. Cluster proportions in communities are reviewed
to see if there exists communities of adversely behaving traders. Cluster proportions are
also studied to see if a certain type of behaviour leads to being among the most or the least
central traders. Statistical significance of the results is tested using hyper-geometric test.
In the next chapter, the implementation of the methods is explained, and the results are
presented.
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4. TRADER BEHAVIOUR IN BITCOIN PEER RE-
VIEW NETWORK
The results of clustering the traders in the peer review networks based on their feature
vector values are presented and discussed in this chapter. Transition matrices are formed
from the cluster patterns of the traders to see how the behaviour of the traders change over
time. Hyper-geometric test is used to highlight exceptional cluster transitions. The results
stem from the two datasets, Bitcoin OTC and Bitcoin Alpha, introduced earlier.
4.1 Trader Clustering
The concept of clustering is previously discussed in section 2.2. In this section, clustering
is applied in practice. As mentioned earlier, clustering is about grouping samples based on
their similarity according to a similarity measure. Euclidean distance is used as a similarity
measure in this work.
Definition 4.1.1 (Features’ Within Cluster Sum of Squares) Calculate a feature vector
(see Def. 3.2.6) per each trader in each aggregated network. Let Z = (z1,z2, ...,zM) be the
list of all feature vectors enumerated from 1 to M. Denote the j:th component in the i:th
feature vector by zi, j. Let the feature vectors be clustered into K clusters, C1,C2, ...,CK .
In accordance with Def. 2.2.1, within cluster sum of squares, W, is
W =
K
∑
k=1
∑
zi∈Ck
5
∑
j=1
(zi, j −µk, j)
2,
where µk, j is the average of the j:th feature of the traders in cluster Ck.
The value for WCSS is used to decide the number of clusters. WCSS is defined in the
context of the feature vectors in Def. 4.1.1. In Def. 4.1.1 WCSS is defined using squared
Euclidean distance measure as done in [53].
To answer the research question:
What kind of behavioural clusters are formed from Bitcoin traders?,
K-means clustering is applied to extract behavioural clusters among traders. All the
features in this work are numerical and thus K-means clustering can be used. K-means
clustering is not applicable to very high dimensional data due to convergence of distance.
In this case, data is five dimensional, thus K-means can be used. In the rest of this work,
K-means clustering with K-means++ initialization is used and referred to as K-means.
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Figure 4.1. The curves show WCSS averaged over all samples with respect to the number
of clusters. Different curves correspond to different values for random state as presented
in the legend. The results are derived using Bitcoin Alpha dataset.
(a) Bitcoin OTC (b) Bitcoin Alpha
Figure 4.2. Labeled feature value quantiles in (a) Bitcoin OTC and (b) Bitcoin Alpha.
Feature values are scaled to range from -1 to 1.
To decide the number of clusters, k, multiple values for k are tried. Also the value for
random state parameter, that affects cluster center initialization, is varied. Due to K-
means++ initialization method it is expected that the random state parameter does not
have a significant impact on clustering result. WCSS is calculated per each clustering
result. As expected and shown in Fig. 4.1, WCSS decreases as the number of clusters
increases, while random state does not have an effect. Increasing the number of clusters
complicates analysis and decreases distinctiveness of the clusters. After trying various
numbers of clusters, 10 clusters are considered to provide sufficient amount of information
while maintaining easy interpretation.
Clustering is done separately for both datasets. In each aggregated network, a feature
vector is calculated for each trader according to Def. 3.2.6. All the feature vectors are used
in clustering. The features are scaled to range from −1 to 1 as K-means is sensitive to
feature value ranges. Without scaling, features such as attention and activity would end up
having the most impact on the clustering result due to their larger value range compared to
the other features.
In order to describe each cluster, the cluster centers are labeled using labeled feature value
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(a) Bitcoin OTC (b) Bitcoin Alpha
Figure 4.3. K-means results with 10 clusters for (a) Bitcoin OTC and (b) Bitcoin Alpha.
The clusters are enumerated from 0 to 9. Cluster centers with respect to each five features
are labeled based on the labeled quantile values in Fig. 4.2. ’Number’ shows the number
of traders in each cluster over all time-steps.
quantiles. Figure 4.2 shows how the quantile values correspond to the labels. Consider the
j:th feature and the k:th cluster. Cluster center labeling is done the following way:
• Cluster center value µk, j is given the label ’medium’, if it is greater than or equal to
the 0.25 quantile and lower than or equal to the 0.75 quantile of the j:th feature.
• Cluster center value µk, j is given the label medium low, if it is lower than the 0.25
quantile and greater than or equal to the 0.15 of the j:th feature.
• Cluster center value µk, j is given the label low, if it is lower than the 0.15 quantile
and greater than or equal to the 0.05 quantile of the j:th feature.
• Cluster center value µk, j is given the label very low, if it is lower than the 0.05
quantile of the j:th feature.
• Cluster center value µk, j is given the label medium high, if it is greater than the 0.75
quantile and lower than or equal to the 0.85 quantile of the j:th feature.
• Cluster center value µk, j is given the label high, if it is greater than the 0.85 quantile
and lower than or equal to the 0.95 quantile of the j:th feature.
• Cluster center value µk, j is given the label very high, if it is greater than the 0.95
quantile of the j:th feature.
If there are repeating quantile values, as is the case for the 0.05 and 0.15 quantiles of
activity in Bitcoin OTC (see Fig. 4.2(a)), the milder label is used. In other words, the label
corresponding to the quantile that is closer to the 0.5 quantile of the feature is used. In this
example, cluster center labels for activity cannot have the label very low in Bitcoin OTC,
and the label for value −1 is low. This is to assure that the labels corresponding to the top
and the least most quantiles do mean extreme feature values. In the rest of the analysis of
the clusters, being disreputable refers to belonging to a cluster which label for reputation is
’medium low’, ’low’ or ’very low’. Being reputable refers to belonging to a cluster which
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(a) Bitcoin OTC (b) Bitcoin Alpha
Figure 4.4. Proportion of traders in each cluster in (a) Bitcoin OTC and (b) Bitcoin Alpha.
The color of each cluster is shown in the color bars.
label for reputation is ’medium high’, ’high’ or ’very high’. Similar logic applies to other
features too, e.g. being ungood versus good. Because none of the clusters have fairness
label ’medium high’, ’high’ or ’very high’, traders in the clusters of medium fairness are
called not unfair to distinguish then from unfair traders. The labeled cluster centers as well
as the number of traders in each cluster are shown in Fig. 4.3. To better illustrate the sizes
of the clusters, pie chart representations are shown in Fig. 4.4.
As can be seen in Figure 4.4, in both datasets there is one main cluster into which roughly
half of the traders belong to. The four largest clusters cover more than 75% of the traders.
The clusters show similarities between the two datasets. Expectedly, the largest cluster has
medium labels. The largest cluster is referred to as the main cluster and traders belonging
to it are referred to as medium traders. As seen in Fig. 4.3, the second largest cluster in both
datasets includes active, unfair traders who gain attention. The third largest cluster contains
reputable and good traders but differs a bit in terms of attention between the datasets. In
Bitcoin OTC, this cluster has traders who gain attention, while in Bitcoin Alpha, cluster
center for attention is ’medium’. Again, the fourth largest cluster has ungood, disreputable
traders in both of the datasets. Interestingly, the cluster centers lie on the low side of the
fairness values. Considering the number of possible cluster centers given that there are 7
labels and 5 features, the cluster centers as substantially similar between the datasets.
To illustrate the clustering result, some of the features are plotted against each other in
Fig. 4.5. In the figure, samples belonging to the same cluster have the same color. The
main cluster is excluded from the figure to add clarity and to introduce trader types that
differ from the medium behaviour. As can be seen in Fig. 4.5, the most of the clusters are
relatively distinct from each other, yet some overlapping can be seen e.g. in Fig.4.5(a).
Due to 5-dimensional feature vectors it is not possible to draw the clustering result in total.
Based on the labeled cluster centers in Fig. 4.3, the clusters are distinct in both datasets.
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(a) Fairness and goodness, Bitcoin OTC (b) Fairness and goodness, Bitcoin Alpha
(c) Activity and reputation, Bitcoin OTC (d) Activity and reputation, Bitcoin Alpha
(e) Attention and reputation, Bitcoin OTC (f) Attention and reputation, Bitcoin Alpha
Figure 4.5. K-means clustering result with respect to the features denoted in the sub-figure
captions. The main cluster that contains medium traders is excluded.
To compare the clusters between the datasets in terms of fairness and goodness, they are
ordered by size and shortly described in Table 4.1. This is to extract interesting clusters
from the perspective of adverse behaviour. In this way, it is easier to see that the six largest
clusters have similar trader types in terms of goodness and fairness. That is, there are
clusters of unfair, ungood and good traders. Although the remaining four clusters differ
by the order between the datasets, one can see from the table that similar trader types are
present. Due to describing the clusters on a high level this is somewhat expected. The
table is used to facilitate interpretation of the cluster transition results presented in the next
section.
4.2 Cluster Transitions
Cluster transition means that a trader switches from a cluster to another or stays in the
same cluster. Consider an arbitrary trader n who is present in a peer review network on
time-steps i and j so that i < j. Trader n is in cluster Ck on the i:th time-step and in cluster
Ck′ on the j:th time-step. There is then a cluster transition from cluster Ck to cluster Ck′ .
Note that it is possible that k = k′.
To see how the behaviour of the traders evolves over time, cluster transition matrix is
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Table 4.1. Clusters ordered by size are shortly described in terms of fairness and goodness
separately for Bitcoin OTC and Bitcoin Alpha datasets. Column ’Number’ shows how
many traders there are in the cluster. ’Description’ shortly outlines the type of traders in
the clusters so that ’ungood’ and ’unfair’ refer to having the labels ’very low’, ’low’ or
’medium low’ for goodness and fairness respectively. ’Good’ and ’fair’ refer to having the
label ’medium high’, ’high’ or ’very high’. Medium labels are left unnoted.
Dataset Cluster Number Description
Bitcoin OTC 1 4399 -
8 2001 Unfair
3 906 Good
9 702 Ungood
2 367 Ungood
5 315 Unfair
4 313 Unfair and ungood
7 150 Unfair and good
0 139 Unfair and ungood
6 84 -
Bitcoin Alpha 0 3266 -
4 1236 Unfair
8 680 Good
7 504 Ungood
2 174 Ungood
6 146 Unfair
9 141 Ungood
5 125 -
3 124 Unfair and good
1 43 Unfair and ungood
formed by taking each trader’s sequence of clusters and recording the transitions. Each
trader n is present on τ(n) of the 12 time-steps. For each trader there is therefore a cluster
pattern length ranging from 1 to 12, that illustrates how the behaviour of the trader evolves
over time. If the last time-step a trader is seen in the data is not the last time-step of the data,
the trader is interpreted to disappear from the network. Disappearing from the peer review
network can be considered to indicate disappearing from the trading platform. All the
same, it could be that a trader continues to trade Bitcoins without receiving or giving any
further ratings. For that matter, it is noted that leaving the peer review network only means
not being part of the with whom to trade -discussion anymore. Disappearing is denoted
as if it would be a cluster represented by the number −1. The number of transitions are
normalized to illustrate probabilities to move from one cluster to another.
Figure 4.6 shows the cluster pattern lengths over all traders. It is clear that the most of
the traders are present only once, meaning that all the ratings they have received and
given have happened during one half a year time period. There are significantly less
traders that are seen in more than one of the aggregated networks. Consequently, it is
expected that disappearing from the network dominates the cluster transitions. Transition
matrices are also formed by not taking disappearance into account to illustrate better how
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(a) Bitcoin OTC (b) Bitcoin Alpha
Figure 4.6. A histogram of the cluster pattern lengths is shown for (a) Bitcoin OTC and
(b) Bitcoin Alpha. The cluster pattern length of a trader is the number of time-steps the
trader is present in a peer review network. The value range for cluster pattern length is
from 1 to 12. Y-axis shows the number of traders, and x-axis shows the cluster pattern
length.
the traders change between the behavioural clusters. In addition, transition matrices are
formed by including only traders who are present on more than one of the time-steps.
This is to see how trader behaviour changes over time. Disappearance is included in
these transition matrices, because it is interesting to see the clusters with the highest and
the lowest disappearance probability among traders who are present on at least 2 of the
time-steps.
Fig. 4.7 presents the cluster transition results. As mentioned above and clearly seen in
4.7(a) and (b), disappearing from the network dominates the transitions in both datasets.
Interestingly, clusters 0,2,4 in Bitcoin OTC (see Fig. 4.7(a)) have the highest probabilities
for disappearing. These clusters include traders with low or very low reputation and
goodness. In Bitcoin Alpha, the highest disappearance probability is seen in clusters 9 and
1 both of which include traders with very low goodness. Worth mentioning is also that
cluster 0 in Bitcoin OTC and cluster 1 in Bitcoin Alpha have the label very low for fairness
too. The clusters from which there are significantly less disappearance, cluster 6 in Bitcoin
OTC and 5 in Bitcoin Alpha, are the clusters with very high attention and activity with
all else feature labels being medium. Also, the clusters of the second least disappearance
probability, cluster 8 in Bitcoin OTC and cluster 4 in Bitcoin Alpha, include active and
noticed traders.
In Figure 4.7 (c)-(d), disappearance is not taken into account. In the datasets, comparably
notable proportion of transitions from the cluster of very unfair and ungood traders, cluster
0 in Bitcoin OTC and cluster 1 in Bitcoin Alpha, are to the cluster of very low goodness and
medium fairness, cluster 2 in Bitcoin OTC and cluster 9 in Bitcoin Alpha. This gives the
impression that unfair behaviour is punished by being distrusted by other traders. It also
indicates that very unfair traders can become more fair afterwards. Figures 4.7(e)-(f) show
the transition matrices of the traders present on at least two of the time-steps. The figures
highlight even further the fact that active and noticed traders with medium reputation
remain in the network while ungood and unfair traders disappear or remain distrusted.
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(a) Transitions with disappearance, Bitcoin OTC (b) Transitions with disappearance, Bitcoin Alpha
(c) Transitions without disappearance, Bitcoin OTC (d) Transitions without disappearance, Bitcoin Alpha
(e) Traders present more than once, Bitcoin OTC (f) Traders present more than once, Bitcoin Alpha
Figure 4.7. Transition proportions in Bitcoin OTC (left) and Bitcoin Alpha (right). Each
cell in the heat-maps presents the proportion of transitions from the cluster on the y axis
that ended up in the cluster on the x axis. Rows sum up to 1, and can be interpreted as
cluster transition probabilities. In (a),(b),(e) and (f), -1 column represents disappearing
from the peer review network. In (c) and (d) disappearance is not taken into account. In
(e) and (f), transitions are recorded for traders present on at least two of the 12 time-steps.
Note that Bitcoin OTC figures cannot be compared to Bitcoin Alpha figures because the
clusters are not the same.
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Interestingly, clusters of good and reputable traders who are not unfair, namely cluster 3 in
Bitcoin OTC and cluster 8 in Bitcoin Alpha, have almost exactly the same disappearance
probabilities in Fig. 4.7(a)-(b) and 4.7(e)-(f).
Due to normalization it is not shown in Fig. 4.7 how the number of transitions varies
between the clusters. Therefore, in order to find exceptional transition probabilities, over-
representation and under-representation of transitions from one cluster to another are tested
using hyper-geometric test. The null-hypothesis in this case is that the observed number of
cluster transitions is a result of random sampling from the cluster distribution. Consider
there are τ observations of switching from cluster A to cluster B, size of which are denoted
by |A| and |B| respectively. In case of over-representation, hyper-geometric distribution
is used to get the probability that there are at least τ transitions from A to B when |A|
elements are sampled from the overall transition distribution. For under-representation,
hyper-geometric distribution gives the probability that there are at most τ transitions.
Significance level α = 0.01 is used. As there are 10 clusters and 11 possible outputs when
taking disappearance into account, Bonferroni corrected significance level αˆ is:
αˆ =
0.01
10×11
≈ 9.09×10−5.
The results of the hyper-geometric tests are shown in Figure 4.8, where the rejection of the
null-hypothesis is denoted by 1. The last columns in the matrices in Fig. 4.8 show from
which clusters there are unusually many or unusually few disappearances. In both datasets,
traders in the main cluster are likely to disappear. Active and noticed traders with medium
reputation disappear from the network exceptionally rarely. In Bitcoin OTC, traders in
clusters 0 and 4 disappear exceptionally often. As seen in Table 4.1, these are the only
clusters in Bitcoin OTC that contain both unfair and ungood traders. Also, cluster 2 that
is the only cluster with ’very low’ reputation and goodness shows over-representation in
disappearance in Bitcoin OTC. For traders who are reputable, good and not unfair it is
unlikely to disappear in Bitcoin OTC. The results indicate that certain type of adverse
behaviour leads to disappearance while well behaving traders stay in the network. In
Bitcoin Alpha, there are exceptionally many disappearances from cluster 9 that is the
only cluster in Bitcoin Alpha that contains inactive traders. While traders in cluster 9 are
also ungood and disreputable this is the case in other clusters too that do not show any
exceptional cluster transitions.
Looking into the diagonals in Fig.4.8(a)-(b), there are similarities between the datasets.
The diagonals represent staying in the same cluster. In the datasets, reputable and good
traders who are not unfair (cluster 3 in Bitcoin OTC, 8 in Bitcoin Alpha) are likely to
remain as they are. For clusters of active and noticed traders (6,8 in Bitcoin OTC, 4,5
in Bitcoin Alpha) it is also common to remain in the same cluster. Considering cluster 2
in Bitcoin OTC, it seems that very disreputable and ungood traders remain distrusted. In
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(a) Over-representation, Bitcoin OTC (b) Over-representation, Bitcoin Alpha
(c) Under-representation, Bitcoin OTC (d) Under-representation, Bitcoin Alpha
Figure 4.8. Exceptional cluster transitions are denoted by 1. Significance level α = 0.01
is used. Figures (a) and (b) show the over-representation results, i.e. the probability of the
observed number of transitions from the cluster on the y axis to the cluster on the x axis
is under Bonferroni corrected α in hyper-geometric tests. Figures (c) and (d) show the
under-representation results. Note that Bitcoin OTC figures cannot be compared to Bitcoin
Alpha figures because the clusters are not the same.
Bitcoin Alpha, staying in the cluster of very low fairness and goodness is over-represented,
indicating that severe adverse behaviour is persistent. Based on the results, there are trader
types for which behaviour is unusually persistent.
Considering the transitions from one cluster to another, it is observed that active and
noticed traders with medium reputation switch to varying types of clusters. This type of
traders can behave adversely afterwards but can also end up among the reputable and good
ones. In both datasets, medium traders switch to other behavioural clusters exceptionally
rarely. Considering the consequences of adverse behaviour it is observed that reputation
is unlikely to be recovered. In Bitcoin OTC, switching from clusters 0 and 4 to cluster 2
is over-represented. This means that for unfair and ungood traders it is probable to lose
reputation even further and to become more fair afterwards. In addition, these traders
change to cluster 8 exceptionally rarely. Changing to cluster 8 would mean reputation
recovery for these traders. Also, there are under-represented cluster transitions from the
clusters of very low goodness but medium fairness in both datasets. These traders change
exceptionally few times to the main cluster. It is also unusual that these traders would
switch to the cluster of active and noticed traders with medium reputation. In Bitcoin OTC,
it is unlikely that these traders become reputable and good afterwards. The results point
out that it is unlikely that severely distrusted traders would recover their reputation.
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4.3 Clusters of Unfairly Rated Traders
It is interesting to study how receiving unfair ratings from others affects a trader’s own
behaviour. The difference between a trader’s goodness and reputation is used to measure
how unfairly the trader is rated. Goodness can be thought as fairness corrected reputation.
The reason for this is that the importance of the ratings received from unfair traders is
decreased while the importance of the ratings received from fair traders is increased. If a
trader has received ratings only from traders with maximum fairness, reputation is equal to
goodness. This type of unfair treatment measure would then have the value zero. Unfair
treatment is divided into two types: positive and negative unfair treatment. A trader whose
reputation is greater than his/her goodness has received unfairly positive ratings. The
same way, a trader whose goodness is greater than his/her reputation has received unfairly
negative ratings.
In each aggregated network, the difference between the reputation and goodness of each
trader is used to extract occasions where a trader has received comparably unfair ratings.
In more detail, using quantile values, traders among the highest in
max(0,r(n)−g(n)),
where r(·) is reputation and g(·) is goodness, are considered to be comparably unfairly
positively rated. Similarly, traders among the highest in max(0,g(n)− r(n)) are taken as
comparably unfairly negatively rated.
Transition matrices of positive and negative unfair treatment cases are formed for both
datasets. From the transition matrices, the over-representations of cluster transitions are
calculated in order to extract the most anomalous results. The number of certain transitions
among unfairly rated traders is compared to the overall transition counts to see if there are
exceptionally many such transitions. More concretely, consider there are M transitions
from cluster A to B among the unfairly rated traders. Denote the number of such transitions
among all the traders by K. Hyper-geometric distribution is used to get the probability of
observing at least M such transitions given the total number of cluster transitions among
the unfairly rated traders and the total number of cluster transitions among all the traders.
It is denoted by 1, if the Bonferroni corrected value of significance level α = 0.01 is
greater than the probability. In other words, rejected null-hypotheses are denoted by 1
while those that are not rejected are denoted by 0. The source clusters of the cluster
transitions represent the behaviour of the unfairly rated traders on the same time-step they
are unfairly rated. Destination clusters show how these traders behave afterwards. The
cluster transitions in this case are used to interpret reactions to unfair treatment.
As mentioned above, unfair treatment is divided into positive and negative unfair treatment.
The above described tests are done separately for the two cases. Over-representation results
are shown in Figure 4.9 Comparing Fig. 4.9 to the cluster center labels in Fig.4.3 and the
cluster descriptions in Tab.4.1, it is seen that exceptionally many of the cluster transitions
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(a) Unfairly positively rated, Bitcoin OTC (b) Unfairly positively rated, Bitcoin Alpha
(c) Unfairly negatively rated, Bitcoin OTC (d) Unfairly negatively rated, Bitcoin Alpha
Figure 4.9. Over-representations of the cluster transitions of unfairly rated traders are
denoted by 1. ’Unfairly positively rated’ refers to having better reputation than goodness,
while ’unfairly negatively rated’ refers to the opposite. The quantile value used in taking
the most unfairly rated traders is 0.95. In the hyper-geometric tests, the Bonferroni
corrected value of significance level α = 0.01 is used. Note that Bitcoin OTC figures
cannot be compared to Bitcoin Alpha figures because the clusters are not the same.
among unfairly positively rated are from the clusters of reputable and good traders. That
is, clusters 3 and 7 in Bitcoin OTC and clusters 3 and 8 in Bitcoin Alpha are the source
clusters of 10/12 and 7/10 respectively of the over-represented cluster transitions. In both
datasets, the remaining over-represented cluster transitions are from the clusters of ungood
traders. Based on the over-represented cluster transitions, unfairly positively rated traders
behave in various ways afterwards. Some of them retain or improve their reputation but
some of them lose their reputation.
Among the unfairly negatively rated traders, all the over-represented cluster transitions are
from clusters of ungood traders as shown in Fig. 4.9(c)-(d). The cluster transitions are
mostly to the clusters of ungood and disreputable traders in both datasets. Disappearing
from the network after being disreputable and ungood is unusually common among
the unfairly negatively rated traders. Remaining with very low reputation is also over-
represented. The results indicate that receiving unfairly negative ratings can partly explain
remaining disreputable and disappearing from the network. In both datasets, one of the
over-represented cluster transitions is from being ungood to being active, noticed and
unfair. This indicates that a reaction to unfair negative treatment is to actively give unfair
ratings to others. Also, reputation and goodness are improved in these cluster transitions
(from 9 to 8 in Bitcoin OTC, and from 7 to 4 in Bitcoin Alpha). The results show that some
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of the unfairly negatively rated traders are able to recover their reputation while retaliating
unfairness by becoming unfair themselves.
The clusters of reputable and good traders dominate the over-representation results of the
unfairly positively rated traders. The same way, clusters of ungood and disreputable traders
include all the unfairly negatively rated cases. While the results might seem intuitive, it is
not due to construction. As shown in Fig. 4.9(a)-(b), a trader in a cluster of ungood and
disreputable traders might still be unfairly positively rated. Similarly, it could happen that
a reputable and good trader would be unfairly negatively rated. It is interesting that this is
not the case in either of the datasets. According to the similarities between the datasets,
some of the reputable traders have achieved their comparably high reputation from unfair
raters. Low reputation can also be due to unfair ratings. However, goodness is quite in line
with reputation in all the clusters. Based on the cluster centers, there are no cases where a
comparably good trader would have a comparably low reputation. Thus, reputation is not
a notably misleading and incorrect way to judge with whom to trade. All the same, the
results indicate that trader behaviour is affected by unfair negative treatment and support
the assumption that a trader can retaliate unfairness.
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5. BITCOIN TRADER COMMUNITIES AND CEN-
TRALITY
In this chapter topological quantities of Bitcoin peer review networks are studied with
respect to the behavioural clusters introduced in the previous chapter. This is to answer the
following research questions:
Are there communities of adversely behaving traders in Bitcoin peer review
networks?
How does centrality relate to traders’ behaviour in Bitcoin peer review net-
works?
Edge weights are not taken into account in community detection and centrality. In Louvain
community detection networks are interpreted undirected. It is studied how network
structure related matters relate to the behavioral clusters. Therefore, the analysis combines
structural and content-based analysis.
5.1 Cluster Proportions in Communities
After clustering the traders based on their behaviour, it is interesting to see who trades
with whom. An edge between two traders can be thought to indicate that these traders
traded or tried to form a deal with each other. Dividing traders into communities enables
exploring what type of traders have been interacting with each other. To divide traders
into communities, Louvain community detection algorithm is run with various values for
random state parameter. Random state defines the seed for the random number generator,
and the final result is sensitive to it. Figure 5.1 shows the number of communities per
Figure 5.1. The number of communities on each of the 12 time-steps using Bitcoin OTC
dataset. The curves refer to the different values of ’random state’ parameter in community
detection algorithm. The values of the random state parameter are shown in the legend.
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(a) 2012-12-31, Bitcoin OTC (b) 2013-12-31, Bitcoin OTC
(c) 2014-06-30, Bitcoin OTC (d) 2014-12-31,Bitcoin OTC
(e) 2012-12-31, Bitcoin Alpha (f) 2014-06-30, Bitcoin Alpha
Figure 5.2. The figures show how traders in each of the behavioural clusters are divided
into communities. The timestamps of the aggregated networks are shown in the sub-figure
titles. The number of communities and the number of traders are also shown in the titles.
Communities are denoted by integers on the x axis. The proportion of traders is shown
on the y axis. The black dashed line shows the 50% limit. The legends of the sub-figure
legends show how the colors map to the clusters. The number of traders in each cluster on
the time-step is also shown in the legend.
each 12 time-steps for Bitcoin OTC. Based on the figure, the number of communities
differs depending on the value of the random state parameter. All the same, the results are
interpreted not to alter drastically. The existence of communities of adversely behaving
traders is considered not to be sensitive to minor changes. Therefore, this algorithm is used
for community detection with arbitrarily chosen random state value. For robustness check,
community detection is run with various random state values to assure the below presented
results are not only due to a particular parameter value. In other words, the communities of
adversely behaving traders found from the data exist also with other random state values
despite the number of communities varies with respect to that parameter.
Per each aggregated network, it is calculated how the traders in each behavioural cluster
are divided into communities. Consider an aggregated network and the traders in it that
belong to a cluster Ck. If the traders are mainly in one community, it indicates that this
type of traders have been rating each other. In this way it is explored if communities of
adversely behaving traders are found in the networks. Figure 5.2 shows how the clusters
are divided into communities on time-steps when interesting communities appear in the
network. A curve showing 50% limit is drawn in the sub-figures, to make it easier to
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(a) OTC, 2012-12-31, 104 traders (b) OTC, 2013-12-31, 87 traders (c) OTC, 2014-06-30, 87 traders
(d) OTC, 2014-12-31, 45 traders (e) Alpha, 2012-12-31, 27 traders (f) Alpha, 2014-06-30, 75 traders
Figure 5.3. Pie charts show how the traders are divided into the behavioural clusters
in a certain community. The chosen communities are the ones where adverse behaviour
dominates. In all of the pie charts, disreputable, ungood or unfair traders cover the
majority of the traders in the community. The color bars next to each sub-figure show how
the colors map to the clusters. The sub-figure captions present the dataset, the time-stamp
and the number of traders in the community. ’OTC’ refers to Bitcoin OTC and ’Alpha’
refers to Bitcoin Alpha.
observe the clusters whose traders belong to a small number of communities. In Fig. 5.2,
the clusters are relatively evenly divided into communities. It seems that in general traders
do not form peer review communities of similarly behaving traders. Yet there are clusters
whose traders are split only into few communities.
Communities that are chosen for further examination are required to be statistically sig-
nificantly dominated by adversely behaving traders. The communities discussed below
are such that the majority and unusually many of the traders belong to a cluster of adverse
behaviour. Only the communities of at least 20 traders are studied in order to focus on the
main events. The statistical significance of the cluster proportions in the communities is
tested using hyper-geometric test. Hyper-geometric distribution is used to get the proba-
bility of observing at least the number of traders in a certain cluster within a community,
when the total number of traders in that community is randomly sampled among all the
traders in the aggregated network. The Bonferroni corrected value of significance level
α = 0.01 is used. All the presented results are statistically significant. Figure 5.3 show
how the traders in the chosen communities are divided into the behavioural clusters. Per
each of the aggregated networks presented in the sub-figures in Fig. 5.2, there is a pie chart
representation in Fig. 5.3 of one of the communities in the network. The pie charts present
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the communities that most clearly indicate that communities of adversely behaving traders
exist.
An interesting observation present in the datasets is that when the proportion of −10
ratings increases, a community of adversely behaving traders appears. In Figure 3.1, the
proportion of −10 ratings increases significantly during the second half of 2012 (the 5th
time-step) in comparison to the previous time-steps. On the 5th time-step, a community of
ungood and disreputable traders appears in both datasets as shown in Figure 5.2(a) and
5.3(a) for Bitcoin OTC and 5.2(e) and 5.3(e) for Bitcoin Alpha. A year later, the proportion
of −10 ratings increases up-to nearly 20% of all the ratings in Bitcoin OTC according to
Fig. 3.1(a). Simultaneously, a community of unfair and ungood (cluster 0) and disreputable
and ungood traders (cluster 2) appears as shown in Fig. 5.3(b). While it is expected that
disreputable traders exist on a time-step when there is a burst of −10 ratings it is not as
self-evident that unfair ones would appear. It is also intriguing that the majority of these
traders have been rating each other.
In both datasets, during the year 2014 the proportion of slightly negative ratings increases
compared to all of the previous time-steps as shown in Fig.3.1. At the same time, commu-
nities of disreputable and ungood traders appear in both trading platforms. Worth noticing
is that these traders have medium fairness. In other words, the majority of the traders
clustered as ungood and not unfair are gathered in the same community in both datasets.
To sum up, there are time-steps when communities of adverse behaviour emerge both in
Bitcoin OTC and in Bitcoin Alpha. Based on the communities with exceptionally many
adversely behaving traders, it can be concluded that communities of distrust and unfairness
are present in Bitcoin peer review networks. The results indicate that traders can react
to unfair and negative feedback by giving back similar feedback. Retaliating unfairness
and reacting to negative feedback by adverse behaviour is in line with previous studies on
human behaviour [4, 5, 7].
5.2 Behaviour of the Most and the Least Central Traders
To answer the research question:
How does centrality relate to traders’ behaviour in Bitcoin peer review net-
works?,
HITS algorithm is run separately per each aggregated network. Each trader in an aggregated
network is given a hub and a authority value. The values are scaled to range from −1
to 1. Cluster proportions among the highest and the lowest hub and authority values are
calculated to see how the most and the least central traders behave. First, it is studied
how the previous behaviour of the traders relates to centrality. In this way it is possible
to analyse if a certain type of behaviour leads to being among the most important traders.
Similarly, it is studied if a certain type of behaviour is related to becoming the least central
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(a) Bitcoin OTC
(b) Bitcoin Alpha
Figure 5.4. Distributions of the previous clusters of traders with the minimum and the
maximum hub and authority values are shown for (a) Bitcoin OTC and (b) Bitcoin Alpha.
The hub and authority values are scaled to range from -1 to 1. The black dashed line
shows the cluster proportions over all the traders. Note that Bitcoin OTC figures cannot
be compared to Bitcoin Alpha figures because the clusters are not the same.
in the network. It is also studied how the current behaviour of the traders relates to the
maximum and the minimum hub and authority values.
Centrality in this context is a measure of how much a trader contributes to a peer review
network. The authorities in a peer review network are traders who have received many
ratings especially from traders that have rated other authorities too. The hubs in a peer
review network are traders that have actively rated others especially the authorities in the
network. Traders with the maximum hub and authority values can be considered the key
contributors in the discussion of with whom to trade. The impact of the traders with the
minimum hub and authority value on the discussion can be considered negligible.
Per each aggregated network starting from the second time-step, traders with the maximum
and the minimum hub and authority values are extracted. Among these traders, only
those that exist in the network before are included. It is then calculated how these
traders are divided into the behavioural clusters. The number of traders in each cluster is
summed up over the time-steps to get the overall cluster proportions of such traders. These
cluster proportions are shown in Fig. 5.4(a) for Bitcoin OTC and Fig. 5.4(b) for Bitcoin
Alpha. Hyper-geometric test is used to extract exceptional cluster proportions to focus
on statistically significant results. The over-representation of traders in a certain cluster
is tested separately for each of the four cases: the maximum hub value, the maximum
authority value, the minimum hub value, the minimum authority value. These results
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(a) Bitcoin OTC (b) Bitcoin Alpha
Figure 5.5. The over-represented previous clusters of the traders with the maximum and
the minimum hub and authority values are shown for (a) Bitcoin OTC and (b) Bitcoin
Alpha. The y axis shows the clusters and x axis the different cases. Note that Bitcoin OTC
figures cannot be compared to Bitcoin Alpha figures because the clusters are not the same.
are shown in the heat-maps in Figure 5.5. The Bonferroni corrected significance level
of α = 0.01 is used in the hyper-geometric test. Similar figures are made for the current
cluster distributions. This is to see how the most and the least central traders behave in
peer review networks. Figure 5.6 shows the current cluster proportions of the traders with
the maximum and the minimum hub and authority values. Over-representation is again
tested by hyper-geometric test. The results are shown in figure 5.7.
As seen in Fig. 5.4 the most of the traders with the maximum hub and authority values
have previously been in the clusters of active and noticed traders. These clusters are 4 and
5 in Bitcoin Alpha and 6 and 8 in Bitcoin OTC. According to Fig. 5.5(a), clusters 6 and 8
are not over-represented among the most central traders in Bitcoin OTC. In Bitcoin Alpha,
there are exceptionally many traders with the highest possible hub value that have been in
cluster 5. Cluster 5 contains highly active and noticed traders. Interestingly, cluster 4 is
over-represented among the lowest in authority although it also contains active and noticed
traders. The traders in cluster 5 are more active and noticed but also more fair than the
traders in cluster 4. This indicates that unfair behaviour is punished by losing authority.
Being active, noticed and not unfair is the way to become one of the main hubs in Bitcoin
Alpha. The same cannot be said about the traders in Bitcoin OTC.
An interesting result present in both datasets is that exceptionally many traders have ended
up with the lowest possible hub value after being reputable, good and not unfair (cluster
3 in Bitcoin OTC and 8 in Bitcoin Alpha). Considering the goodness and fairness, these
clusters can be stated to include the most well behaving traders. It is quite counter-intuitive
that such traders do not gain importance afterwards. The results indicate that the most well
behaving traders have the most negligible impact on the peer review network and have a
lower need to rate others than the rest.
Analysing the current clusters, Fig. 5.6 indicates that the most of the hubs and the
authorities are in the clusters of active and noticed traders. Also, medium traders seem
to be the least central. According to the over-representations shown in Fig. 5.7, highly
active and noticed traders that are not unfair are over-represented among the traders with
the maximum hub and authority values.
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(a) Bitcoin OTC
(b) Bitcoin Alpha
Figure 5.6. Distributions of the current clusters of traders with the minimum and the
maximum hub and authority values are shown for (a) Bitcoin OTC and (b) Bitcoin Alpha.
The hub and authority values are scaled to range from -1 to 1. The black dashed line
shows the cluster proportions over all the traders. Note that Bitcoin OTC figures cannot
be compared to Bitcoin Alpha figures because the clusters are not the same.
(a) Bitcoin OTC (b) Bitcoin Alpha
Figure 5.7. The over-represented current clusters of the traders with the maximum and the
minimum hub and authority values are shown for (a) Bitcoin OTC and (b) Bitcoin Alpha.
The y axis shows the clusters and x axis the different cases. Note that Bitcoin OTC figures
cannot be compared to Bitcoin Alpha figures because the clusters are not the same.
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Based on how HITS algorithm works, it is expected that active traders have high hub
values and traders who gain attention have high authority values. However, active and
noticed traders who are unfair are not over-represented among the hubs and the authorities.
This is the case in both datasets. In both datasets, there are many over-represented clusters
among traders with the minimum hub value. Hence, traders with the minimum hub value
can behave in various ways. Interestingly, the two over-represented clusters among traders
with the minimum authority value are similar between the datasets. Traders who are either
unfair or ungood with medium activity and attention are the least authorities in the network.
To sum up, the most well behaving traders become the least contributors in the peer
review networks exceptionally often. The current behaviour of traders with the minimum
hub value varies significantly. Expectedly, highly active and noticed traders are over-
represented among the hubs and the authorities. Yet, it seems not to be enough to be
active and noticed to end up among the most central traders. Traders who do not behave
adversely are unusually often the hubs and the authorities in the networks. Being unfair
leads exceptionally many times to having the minimum authority value in Bitcoin Alpha.
The results can be interpreted so that fairness pays back in terms of becoming central while
behaving well shows the opposite.
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In this chapter, the research questions are shortly answered by summarizing the results
presented in the previous chapters. Limitations and future prospects of this work are
discussed. The last section discusses the contribution of this work.
6.1 Answers to the Research Questions
The first research question: what kind of behavioural clusters are formed from Bitcoin
traders, is answered by clustering the traders into 10 clusters based on their behaviour. The
results show clear similarities between the datasets. Roughly half of the traders belong to a
behavioural cluster where all the cluster center labels are medium. Based on the labeled
cluster centers, the clusters are distinct in both datasets. In both datasets, there is a cluster
containing the most well behaving traders and a cluster containing the most adversely
behaving traders in terms of goodness and fairness.
The second research question: how does a trader’s behaviour in a Bitcoin peer review
network change over time, is answered by extracting statistically significant cluster tran-
sitions. The results show some similarities between the datasets. The medium traders
disappear form the network unusually often and switch to many other behavioural clusters
unusually seldom. Active and noticed traders with medium reputation behave in various
ways but disappear from the network unusually seldom. There are trader types for which
the behaviour is unusually persistent. The most well behaving traders stay in the same
cluster exceptionally often. For active and noticed traders with medium reputation it is
common to remain that way. In Bitcoin Alpha, the most adversely behaving traders are
likely to stay as they are. In Bitcoin OTC, highly disreputable traders remain the same
way. Moreover, certain types of adverse behaviour seem to be punished. It is unlikely that
severely distrusted traders would recover their reputation. In Bitcoin OTC, traders who are
both ungood and unfair are prone to end up among the lowest in reputation or disappear
from the network. In Bitcoin Alpha, ungood and inactive ones are likely to disappear from
the network.
The third research question: what is the impact of receiving unfair ratings on a trader’s
behaviour in a Bitcoin peer review network, is answered by studying the over-represented
cluster transitions among unfairly rated traders. The results indicate that some of the most
reputable traders have received their comparably high reputation from unfairly positive
ratings. Also, some of the disreputable traders have received unfairly positive ratings.
There is no clear pattern of how the behaviour of unfairly positively rated traders evolve
over time. Some of the unfairly positively rated traders retain or improve their reputation
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but some of them lose their reputation. Unfair negative treatment can be interpreted to
partly explain disappearance from the network after being distrusted by other traders.
Interestingly, one of the over-representations in both datasets shows that unfairly negatively
rated traders can become more unfair themselves. Although thorough explanation for the
change in behaviour cannot be stated based on the cluster transitions, the results indicate
that some of the unfairly negatively rated traders start to rate others more actively and
unfairly, while receiving more ratings and improving their own reputation.
The fourth research question: are there communities of adversely behaving traders in
Bitcoin peer review networks, is answered by finding communities where adverse be-
haviour statistically significantly dominates. The results show that on time-steps where the
proportion of negative ratings increases compared to the previous time-steps, communities
of adverse behaviour are found. In other words, there are groups of unfair and ungood
traders who have mainly been rating each others. This together with the result of unfairly
negatively rated traders becoming unfair themselves gives the impression that traders react
to negative feedback and unfair negative ratings by giving similar ratings to others.
The last research question: how does centrality relate to traders’ behaviour in Bitcoin
peer review networks, is answered by calculating the cluster proportions among traders
with the maximum hub value, the maximum authority value, the minimum hub value and
the minimum authority value. Both the previous and the current clusters of such traders
are analysed. Surprisingly, in both datasets the most well behaving traders end up having
the minimum hub value exceptionally often. Expectedly, being highly active and noticed
is a way to become and remain a key contributor in the peer review networks. Yet, it is
not enough to be active and noticed. The most central traders are also medium fair while
active, noticed but unfair traders end up with the minimum authority value unusually often
in Bitcoin Alpha.
6.2 Limitations and Future Prospects
The results presented in this work are based on the trust rating data from two online
Bitcoin trading platforms. Due to excluding other types of data, the results are considered
preliminary. Data from other Bitcoin trading platforms and Bitcoin transaction data could
be added to further analyse Bitcoin trader behaviour. Also, the research topic could be
extended to include data about other types of peer preview networks. In the future, it would
be interesting to add more data to study if the results show similarities with the results
presented in this work.
Considering the mathematical methods chosen in this work, it is outside the scope of this
work to compare different methods. Although the methods are deliberately decided, it
limits the generality of the results that the analysis is not done by comparing the methods.
Analysing trader behaviour based on the behavioural clusters is considered a reasonable
approach to find the main trader types and the clearest patterns in trader behaviour. It
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is noted, however, that clustering simplifies the data. The cluster centers do not fully
represent the traders in the clusters, and the results are considered indicative. For future
research it would be interesting to compare for example different clustering algorithms.
Future research could also include testing various models to explore how trader behaviour
changes over time. Moreover, cluster transitions and feature relations could be analyzed
even further as the scope of this work left many behavioural questions outside.
In accordance with the previous studies, the traders are given the maximum fairness value
in case there are no given trust ratings. It can be argued that such a choice is not the most
reasonable. For example, traders with no given ratings could be given the average of the
fairness values over the traders who have been rating others. Alternatively, clustering
could be modified to exclude fairness of traders with no given ratings. Also, giving the
reputation and goodness value zero to traders with no received ratings can be questioned.
Traders with zero reputation are considered comparably distrusted in Bitcoin OTC, which
can be argued to be a false interpretation of traders with no received ratings. However, it
would also be misleading to give positive or negative reputation and goodness for such
traders because there is a clear meaning for the signed rating values. Giving the value 0 is
considered a natural choice to represent that a trader’s trustworthiness is unclear. In that
way, reputation is in line with how goodness is designed. The impact of the choice on
clustering result could be removed by excluding the reputation and goodness of the traders
with no received ratings. The choices made in this work are not considered to notably
affect the results. Yet, alternative ways to interpret the cases of no given and no received
ratings could be studied further.
6.3 Contribution
This work continues the state-of-the-art research on online social networks by analysing
trader behaviour in Bitcoin trader peer review networks. Previous studies on the same
datasets concentrate on more general topics: link prediction and fraudulent user detection.
This work builds on top of the existing research by taking a specific view and a deeper look
into Bitcoin OTC and Bitcoin Alpha trust rating datasets. To the best of my knowledge
this is the first research that models Bitcoin trader behaviour using peer review network
data. For this reason the results are interesting as cryptocurrencies and online interactions
between strangers become more popular every day. This work also contributes to the study
on interactions between humans by providing results on how humans rate each other in
peer review networks and how they react to unfairness. To assess unfair treatment, the
features developed in previous studies are used to derive a measure for how unfairly a
trader is rated in a peer review network. This work builds on top of the existing research
and provides results on the functionality of peer review networks.
In this work, methods and quantities related to the study of complex networks are combined
with techniques of exploratory data science. The study of complex networks is applied
in deriving the features from the signed, weighted edges. Clustering the feature vectors
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in turn is a typical approach in exploratory data science. Also, network structure related
matters, communities and centrality, are studied in relation to the behavioural clusters.
This work contributes to the research on online social networks by applying mathematical
methods from multiple scientific fields. In its specificity, this work contributes to Bitcoin
trading by providing observations of Bitcoin trader behaviour in peer review networks.
In its generality, the results contribute to the research on social networks and analysis of
human behaviour. The same approach can easily be applied in the analysis of other peer
review networks and other types of social networks.
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